Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Fall 2009

The Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Fichte's
Wissenschaftslehre
Kenneth Angwe Agede

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Agede, K. (2009). The Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre
(Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/251

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne
Scholarship Collection.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM:
FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Kenneth Angwe Agede

December 2009

Copyright by
Kenneth Angwe Agede

2009

iii

THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM:
FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE

By
Kenneth Angwe Agede
Approved November 6, 2008

Approved____________________________________________
Tom Rockmore, Ph.D., Dissertation Director
Professor of Philosophy

Approved____________________________________________
Ronald Polansky, Ph.D., Reader
Professor of Philosophy

Approved____________________________________________
Daniel Selcer, Ph.D., Reader
Assistant Professor of Philosophy

Approved____________________________________________
James Swindal, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Philosophy
Approved____________________________________________
Christopher Duncan, Ph.D., Dean
Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate Scool of Liberal Arts

iv
ABSTRACT

THE TRANSFORMATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM:
FICHTE’S WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE

By
Kenneth Angwe Agede
December 2009

Dissertation supervised by Tom Rockmore
This dissertation examines Fichte’s original philosophical system, or the
Wissenschaftslehre, against the background of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and was
conceived within the framework of restating Kant’s critical philosophy. Although Fichte
hyperbolically claims that his philosophical view is identical with Kant’s transcendental
system, the question of his relationship to Kant is a controversial one and continues to
generate intense debate in the literature. Some Fichte commentators flatly reject
comparisons between the two philosophical positions, claiming that Fichte’s system is a
variant of Reinhold’s, whose Elementarphilosophie sought to return Kant to a Cartesian
model of mind. Others, however, see striking similarities between the theories of Kant
and Fichte. They maintain, though, that Fichte’s Kantianism should be qualified: for
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although certain aspects of his theory look obviously Kantian, they insist that Fichte’s
theory is still unique in a variety of ways.
This dissertation argues the thesis that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is identical
with and yet different from Kant’s theory. To the extent that Fichte rejects a
representationalist solution to the problem of knowledge, his position is true to the spirit
of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy. However, to the extent that his method of
presentation differs from Kant’s, Fichte’s view is his own and should be evaluated on its
own merit.
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General Introduction
In The Science of Knowledge, Fichte writes:
If people wish to make inquiries concerning such objective validity of thought,
or the bond between this object and the subject, I confess that the Science of
Knowledge can give no information on this point. Let them set out on their own to
discover such a bond, in this way or any other case; until they bethink
themselves, perhaps, that this unknown they are in search of is still their own
thought and that what they again wish to lay beneath is also merely a thought of
theirs, and so on forever; and that they are wholly unable to inquire or to speak
about anything, without in fact thinking of it.1
The above statement constitutes the core principle of Fichte’s philosophical position, the
Wissenschaftslehre, his attempt to establish philosophy as a systematic science, which
was formulated within the broader framework of the reconstruction of Kant’s critical
theory.
Fichte’s relationship to Kant can be described as ambivalent. On the one hand, he
is attracted to Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, especially its
emphasis on the primacy of practical reason in the grounding of knowledge. On the other
hand, he claims that Kant has failed in his attempt to establish philosophy as a system.
Kant’s intellectual revolution in philosophy proposes an alternative way of evaluating our
cognitive relationship to the world. Unlike the previous intellectual paradigms, he
predicates passivity of the cognitive object rather than the subject. By making the subject
active vis-à-vis the object of cognition, Kant formulates the problem of knowledge in
terms of cognizing the structures of consciousness rather than an autonomous object that
could, under the right conditions be fully comprehended in its objective existence.

1

J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge. With First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath
and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 36.
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Although Kant’s position is considered an advance on that of his predecessors,
Fichte is concerned that the residual dualistic tendencies in Kant’s position undermine the
revolutionary character of Kant’s philosophical view. We may recall that Kant draws a
line of demarcation between noumenon and phenomenon. In order to avoid having
representation that is uncaused, Kant postulates the domains of appearance and the thingin-itself. He declares the realm of the former the one of knowledge while insisting that
the latter is the sphere of the epistemologically unknown. In Fichte’s view, the
appearance/things-in-themselves reduces Kant’s philosophical theory to a variant of
dogmatism. However, unlike Kant’s critics who call for abandoning of the critical
method, Fichte insists that Kant’s position should be restated, not abandoned.
Accordingly, he advocates abandoning its letter in order to retain its spirit.
Fichte maintains that the question of the relationship of the subject to the object
could be approached from the point of view of either idealism or dogmatism, which
Fichte acknowledged as the only possible systems of philosophy. According to Fichte,
the sticking point between these two possible philosophical insights, which are
necessarily antithetical, concerns how to constitute the ground of philosophy. Fichte
indicates that idealism favors the intellect, while dogmatism privileges the thing. Owing
to their deep-seated disagreement with regard to the issue of the fundamental ground of
system, Fichte claims that neither idealism nor dogmatism can refute the other on its own
terms. Fichte is firmly convinced that the person who is appreciative of freedom would
choose idealism, while the one who privileges nature over freedom would opt for
dogmatism. For electing to evaluate the subject/object relationship from the standpoint of
the object, Fichte maintains that dogmatism fails as an epistemological strategy.
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For Fichte, since dogmatism fails an epistemological paradigm, we should turn to
idealism. Fichte further claims that it is the only possible approach with the capability of
resolving the problem of knowledge. Fichte utilizes the resource of the idealistic system
of philosophy with the main purpose of overcoming what he considers the pitfalls that
characterized Kant’s philosophical system. Consistent with his idealistic philosophical
program, Fichte derives the object from the subject in the quest for knowledge. With this
approach, Fichte makes the subject and the object two sides of one and same reality.
There is a renewal of interest in Fichte’s philosophical position. Fichte is an
important figure in the modern philosophical period. He inaugurated the post-Kantian
German idealism tradition. He also serves as a link between Kant and the later
philosophical discussion, especially Hegel. However, the literature tended to reduce him
to a mere commentator on Kant. Concerned by what he termed an unfair characterization
of Fichte, Dieter Henrich sought to establish Fichte as an original philosophical thinker in
his own right. In particular, he was able to show that Fichte’s philosophical position
constitutes an original contribution to the history of Western philosophy.2 Following the
example of Henrich, other interpreters of Fichte, including Daniel Breazeale, George di
Giovanni, and Henry Harris, have argued that although Fichte’s theory bears certain
resemblances to Kant’s, it should be evaluated on its own merit. Following this example,
Tom Rockmore assessed the continuing Fichtean influence on the later philosophical
discussion, especially its impact on the philosophical systems of the neo-Hegelians and
Marx.

2

George J. Seidel, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1794: A Commentary on Part 1 (West Lafayette, IN:
Purdue University Press, 1993), 5–6.
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Since the first North American Fichte conference was held on the campus of
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA, sixteen years ago, interest in Fichte’s philosophical
position has more than doubled, as is evidenced by the volume and the sophistication of
the debate. Nevertheless, certain aspects of Fichte, such as the social and historical
aspects of his thought, have received only scant attention in the literature. Also, Fichte
scholarship has gone in different directions as scholars continue to seek a better grasp of
the basic principle and significance of his theory.
Although his Wissenschaftslehre is one among several theories that emerged in
the attempt to revise Kant’s transcendental idealism, Fichte asserts that his philosophical
position is Kantianism properly stated. Furthermore, he considers himself Kant’s
legitimate successor. This dissertation will argue that in his early Jena period, Fichte
invokes the notion of the Wissenschaftslehre to develop an idealistic theory of knowledge
in which the subject posits its existence absolutely as the subject and object of
knowledge. I will interpret his Wissenschaftslehre as a theory of knowledge, and argue
that Fichte develops a first-person epistemology, which could be viewed as a rejection of
the approach of the previous intellectual systems which defined reality in terms of the
givenness of the object to the subject. Fichte denies independent reality to the external
world, and reduces that external world to an extension of the cognitive subject that makes
it possible for the object to exist. My analysis will be based on the early Jena project,
especially its 1794/5 formulation. In my opinion, the early Jena period of Fichte’s theory
is the closest to Kant’s view.
This dissertation identifies two approaches to Fichte’s theory: foundationalism
and antifoundationalism. The former defends the position that Fichte’s project of the
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Wissenschaftslehre amounts to a search for certainty in philosophy. The latter perspective
argues that although philosophy seeks the attainment of certainty, this goal cannot be met
in practice. The present inquiry adopts the antifoundationalist rather than the
foundationalist perspective in its investigation of Fichte’s philosophical view. In
particular, I argue a thesis similar to that of Ives Radrizzani. Radrizzani maintains that for
Fichte, philosophy grows out of the experiences of life. In particular, he thinks that
Fichte’s theory was an attempt to come to terms with the events of his day, such as the
French revolution, as well as an attempt to shape the reception of those events.

Chapter One
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
Introduction
This chapter is devoted to the exposition of Kant’s transcendental idealism, with
emphasis on its immediate reception, in order to provide the background against which
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre came to be formulated. It has to be stated at the outset that it
is not the scope of this chapter to undertake a full-scale reconstruction of Kant’s
transcendental doctrine; instead, it is intended as a rehearsal of some aspects of his
theory, especially his co-called Copernican turn in philosophy, that assist us in
understanding the connection between his philosophical position and Fichte’s.
Although his original philosophical position was formulated within the wider
framework of revising Kant’s critical project, Fichte famously claims that his
philosophical view is consistent with Kant’s transcendental philosophy, further
suggesting that his grasp of the master’s theory surpasses everyone else’s, including that
of Kant himself, an assertion that was well received by the young Schelling and Hegel.
Hence any investigation of Fichte’s philosophical position must begin with an account of
Kant’s critical philosophical program.
Kant believed that philosophical systems earlier than his own lacked a system, as
he understood it. This state of affairs, the lack of systematicity in philosophy, was a
matter of concern to Kant. For instance, Kant feared that this situation undermined
philosophy’s ability to successfully engage the issues with which it was concerned. Most
worrisome to Kant was the fact that philosophy’s attempts to formulate a credible theory
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of knowledge were compromised, casting serious aspersions on the status of philosophy
as the “queen of the sciences.” In Kant’s view, the only way forward for philosophy was
an intellectual revolution; otherwise it remained an “ocean without banks.”
In what follows, I review the rationalism/empiricism debate, the eighteenthcentury intellectual discussion that formed the background to Kant’s critical method.
Next, I rehearse Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy. Thereafter I examine the
immediate reception of Kant’s critical method. The operative assumption of this chapter
is similar to that of Zeman.1 Zeman quite accurately hypothesizes that Kant’s critical
project transforms metaphysics into epistemology by shifting the focus to our intuition of
objects in space which are our inventions as opposed to trying to grasp these objects in
their objective existence. In this way, Kant substitutes for the previous intellectual
paradigms that formulated the problem of knowledge in terms of the subject’s direct and
immediate grasp of the object of cognition an alternative way of understanding our
cognitive relationship to the world by construing knowledge as the “organization of the
mind itself.”

1.1 The Rationalism/Empiricism Debate as the Conceptual Framework for the
Emergence of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
It feels safe to posit that Kant’s critical project, and indeed the German idealism
tradition itself, grew out of the rationalism/empiricism debate, the eighteenth-century
intellectual discussion concerning the relationship of the cognitive subject to the object

1

Vladimir Zeman, “Between Kant and Hegel: Fichte’s Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in
New Essays in Fichte’s Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge, ed. Daniel Breazeale
and Tom Rockmore (New York: Humanity Books, 2001), 199–200.
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it cognizes. Attempts in traditional metaphysics to explain knowledge contributed to the
emergence of two influential but incompatible systems of philosophy, rationalism and
empiricism. As they rival systems of philosophy, the choice of one was believed to
necessarily exclude the other. It was between these two philosophical insights that the
student of philosophy had to choose at the time.2
The rationalist philosophical system propagated the doctrine that it is possible to
comprehend ultimate reality, such as innate ideas, a belief that partially accounts for its
willingness to employ reason beyond common sense.3 Concerned that sensation fails as a
reliable source of knowledge, rationalism tended to exclude it from any serious
consideration for knowledge. To the rationalist philosopher, the senses lack the capacity
to yield real knowledge.
Inspired by the successes of the new sciences, especially mathematics, which it
thought capable of yielding objective knowledge, the rationalist approach to philosophy
took as the starting point of its philosophical investigation propositions and axioms it
believed to be clearly defined and firmly established.4 Real knowledge, according to the
rationalist philosophical system, is capable of extending beyond sensation. Among the
philosophers associated with the rationalist insight are René Descartes (1591–1650),
Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677), and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716).

2

Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures On German Idealism. Edited by David S. Pacini,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 85.
3
Georges Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytic Introduction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 4.
4
Onora O’Neill, “Vindicating Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 292.
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By contrast, the empiricist approach to philosophy objected to the method of the
rationalist approach to philosophy. In particular, empiricism rejected the a priori method
adopted by rationalism favoring, instead, the a posteriori one. In opposition to
rationalism, the empiricist approach to philosophy restricted knowledge to sense
perception.5 The empiricist philosophical method criticized the mathematical method,
claiming that it failed in its effort to provide objective knowledge since all it did was
offer a description of ideas. For example, on the basis of its distrust of innate ideas, the
empiricist framework rejected arguments meant to prove the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul. The main proponents of this approach include John Locke (16321704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and David Hume (1711–1776).
Although rationalism and empiricism both tended to overrate their
accomplishments while undermining those of the alternative, Kant quite appropriately
dismissed their claims, contending that neither of them had a satisfactory view of
knowledge. Accordingly, he invited rationalism and empiricism to confront their
assumptions, further inviting them to conceive new ways of evaluating our cognitive
relationship to the world. Kant accused both schools of philosophy of distorting the true
nature of experience, which they erroneously characterized as a “thing-in-itself” (Ding an
sich). Following from this mischaracterization, rationalism and empiricism, according to
Kant, formulated the problem of knowledge in terms of reason’s ability to comprehend a
mind-independent reality that could, under the right conditions be known, as it
objectively exists beyond appearance.6 From rationalism and empiricism, Kant creates an
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Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 4.
Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century
Backgrounds (New York: Humanities Press, 1978), 12.
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alternative frame of reference that assists him in the formulation of his theory of
knowledge.
Kant’s model of mind allows both thought and experience to contribute to our
theory of knowledge in basically the same way, something rationalism and empiricism
tended to reject. By its utter distrust of the senses, Kant argues, rationalism deprives itself
of the very subject matter of knowledge, while by its wholesale rejection of innate ideas,
Kant contends, empiricism denies itself the concepts with which to explain experience.7
If Kant’s model of mind offers us an insight into the nature of his relationship
with his predecessors, it is that he is simultaneously a friend and a critic of traditional
metaphysics. On the one hand, he rejects the claims of traditional metaphysics; on the
other hand, he is sympathetic to certain aspects of metaphysical theories and actually
weaves them into his own system. It is this ambivalent relationship with his predecessors,
even though it looks ordinary today, which constitutes Kant’s genius.
Kant’s theory is a combination of several factors. He was initially influenced by
the Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalist approach to philosophy, and had a genuine
commitment to metaphysics as is indicated by the
following correspondence with Moses Mendelssohn. In a draft of a letter to Mendelssohn
Kant writes:
I am far from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to be trivial or
dispensable; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that I understand its
nature and its place in human knowledge and that the true and lasting welfare of
the human race depends on it.8

7

Roger Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A Short History of Modern Philosophy (New York:
Harper & Row, 1981), 140-1.
8
Immanuel Kant, “Draft of a Letter Moses Mendelssohn, April 8, 1766,” in Immanuel Kant, Philosophical
Correspondence, 1759–99, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 55.
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Prima facie, the above correspondence seems to be inconsistent with the spirit of Kant’s
intellectual revolution. However, it has to be indicated that Kant elicits a distinction
between what he refers to as bad and good metaphysics. He classifies as bad metaphysics
the philosophical view which grants the mind a direct intuition of the object of
consciousness. He terms good metaphysics the philosophical doctrine that denies human
reason immediate contact with any transcendent reality. While he is opposed to bad
metaphysics, Kant is favorably disposed toward good metaphysics. Kant’s interest in
metaphysics, according to Henrich, makes him akin to Aristotle’s. Henrich further
contends that Kant’s critical theory was meant to resolve the hitherto unresolved
problems of metaphysics with the purpose of providing a firm foundation for
metaphysics.9
Kant was also a product of the Lutheran pietist tradition, a seventeenth-century
religious movement that tended to privilege the emotional and the moral over the
dogmatic and ritualistic elements of Christianity. The pietist influence may have
contributed to Kant’s attraction to David Hume, whom he credits with disrupting his
dogmatism: “I freely admit that the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that
many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different
direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy.10 Although he
subscribed to Hume’s skeptical philosophy, Kant rejected its conclusions that the

9

Henrich, Between Kant to Hegel, 26–7.
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: With Selections from “The Critique of Pure
Reason,” ed. Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 10.
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principle of causality is the product of habit. For Kant, causality is the product of
understanding.11
In regard to Kant’s theory, the impact of the Enlightenment tradition cannot be
underestimated either. The Enlightenment movement was an eighteenth-century tradition
that sought to subordinate everything, including faith and politics, to the authority of
reason. As indicated by Cassirer, the Enlightenment scholars were agreed that something
common to all should ground knowledge rather than something that was limited in
scope.12 The Enlightenment scholars believed that reason alone had the capability of
critiquing itself as well as the notion of external space,13 further insisting that any attempt
to explain knowledge on the basis of some transcendent reality was doomed to failure.14
The strategy of making everything answerable to reason marked a significant
departure from the approach of the divine epistemological model, which tended to elevate
faith over reason. This approach, the scholars argued, encouraged blind obedience to
dead dogmas.”15 As far as the Enlightenment scholars were concerned, any action that
made an appeal to traditional authority–the dogmatic churches and the hereditary
aristocracies of medieval Europe–was considered coerced and, therefore, should be
discouraged. They argued that the time had come for the individual to invest in his reason
rather than defer to someone else.16 Figures of the Enlightenment included Robert Boyle
(1627–1691), Nicholas Malebranche (1638–1715), Isaac Newton (1642–1727), Pierre
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Otfried Höffe, Immanuel Kant, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1994), p. 19.
12
Ernest Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans., Fritz C. A. Koelln and James Pettegrove,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 6.
13
Ibid., 5.
14
Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism, 12.
15
Ibid.
16
John Herman Randall, Jr., The Career of Philosophy vol 2, From the German Enlightenment to the Age of
Darwin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 65.
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Bayle (1647–1706), Jean le Rond D’Alembert (1717–1783), and Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804). While the advocates may not have been particular concerned with the issue of
grounding, it could be reasonably inferred that the principles of the tradition shaped
Kant’s views in significant ways, and may have contributed to his idea of the ground of
system.
Without any question, Kant was concerned about the antinomies or contradictions
which are generated when reason is extended beyond its limits. But he may possibly have
had other concerns in view. For instance, by the mid eighteenth-century, Aristotelian
metaphysics, the dominant philosophical system of seventeenth-century intellectual life
in Germany, was beginning to lose its influence, due in part to the challenge posed by the
new sciences. In comparison to what was widely believed to be the successes of the new
sciences, Aristotelian metaphysics was deemed a failure, due to its inability to say
something definitive with regard to the issues with which it was concerned. This
development seemed to undermine the reputation of the “concepts and methods of
Aristotelianism.”17 Christian Wolff (1679–1754) sought to facilitate an Aristotelian
response by suggesting that metaphysics imitate the sciences, especially mathematics, by
taking as its starting point clearly defined principles and concepts, arguing that this was
the only approach capable of salvaging the reputation of philosophy.18
The Wolffian proposal was rejected, however, by the Thomasian tradition,
claiming that it posed a serious threat to faith. Contrary to Wolff, members of the
Thomasian tradition insisted that the method of philosophy should be empirical and
17

Frederick Beiser, “Kant’s Intellectual Development: 1746 –1781,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant,
ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 27.
18
Manfred Kuehn, “The German Aufklärung and British Philosophy,” in British Philosophy and the Age of
Enlightenment, Routledge History of Philosophy vol. 5, ed. Stuart Brown (New York: Routledge, 2003),
312.
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inductive rather than “mathematical and deductive. They feared that Wolff’s proposal
reinforced the Enlightenment’s attempt to subordinate everything, including faith, to the
authority of reason. Beiser notes that the Thomasian scholars protested that,
the Enlightenment reign of reason had become the reign of death and
denunciation since the mechanistic methods of modern science, and the critical
demands of the modern philosophy were leading straight toward atheism,
fatalism, and anarchism. The more science advanced, the less room there seemed
to be for freedom, and God in the universe; and the more philosophy exercised its
critical powers, the less authority could be claimed for the bible and the old proofs
of the existence of God, providence, and immortality.19
Christian Crusius, who became the face of the Thomasian opposition to Wolff, assigned
reason only a minimal role in the constitution of reality by contending that human reason
alone could not provide a satisfactory account of the world.20
Founded by Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), the Thomasian movement was an
anti-intellectual fundamentalist tradition, with ties to Martin Luther and the Reformation,
which sought to revise Christianity and faith by focusing on the emotional and the moral
rather than the dogmatic and the ritualistic tendencies of faith preferred by the established
churches.21 Though not a school of philosophy in terms of having a clearly identifiable
philosophical position, and probably at its best when attacking someone else’s point of
view, the Thomasian movement was associated with a correspondence theory of truth,
was favorably disposed toward sensationalism, tended to subordinate the faculty of
reason to that of free will, and exhibited the tendency to make philosophy the
handmaiden of theology. Followers of Thomasius included Franciscus Büdde (1667–
1729), Joachim Lange (1703–1744), Andreas Rüdiger (1673–1731), A. F. Höffmann
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(1703–1741), Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), and Johann Jacob Brucker (1696–
1770).
Like Kant and Fichte, Christian Wolff was influenced by the rationalist system of
philosophy. Additionally, he was familiar with the Calvinist, Catholic, and Lutheran
religious principles. Although not known as an original thinker, Wolff was a systematic
writer, and probably the most important thinker in the period between the death of
Leibniz and the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, whose views had a
considerable influence on his contemporaries, including Kant’s teacher, Martin Knutzen,
as well as Moses Mendelssohn, J. H. Lambert, and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten22
The battle concerning what method should be adopted in examining the relations
of faith to reason, which was fought on the campus of the University of Halle, raged well
into the late 1740s and the early 1750s, when Kant was beginning a career in academia at
the University of Königsberg.23 The controversy assumed an ugly dimension in 1721
following Wolff’s address to the University of Halle, believed by the Thomasian tradition
to be confrontational in intent. In an address entitled “On the Practical Philosophy of the
Chinese,” Wolff made some contentious claims. First, he suggested that reason rather
than revelation was the ground of ethics; second, he minimized any serious tension
between Christian and Chinese ethics by indicating that there was no fundamental
difference between them; third, he rejected the suggestion that religion necessarily
grounded ethics; and fourth, he submitted that reason alone was capable of yielding truth.
As indicated by Beck, Wolff’s position merely rehearsed that of Descartes and Spinoza,
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who had previously argued that the mind alone could lead to the discovery of indubitable
truths.24
Members of the Thomasian tradition regarded Wolff’s claims as offensive, and
accused him of provocation. More precisely, they construed Wolff’s action as a flagrant
exhibition of atheism and fatalism. Consequently, the pietist scholars masterminded his
expulsion from the University of Halle, and further prevailed on Frederick I to banish
him from Prussia.25
Thus the challenge confronting any would-be participant in the debate over the
relation of faith and reason, including Kant, was similar to the one faced by Wolff: how
does one propose and defend a thesis that was rigorous and yet respectful of the
sensitivities of the
pietist fundamentalist tradition? For Kant, the answer was the transcendental analysis of
reason.

1.2. Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Philosophy
For Kant, the successes of the sciences, on the one hand, and the inability of
metaphysics, on the other, to achieve consensus regarding the method of philosophy,
which came to portray philosophy in bad light, underscored the need for a revolution in
philosophy. This realization puts Kant on the same intellectual level as other intellectual
greats such as Bacon, Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl, themselves revolutionaries in their
own right. These greats had earlier launched a conceptual revolution to salvage the
reputation of their respective specialties by suggesting alternative but compelling ways of
24
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viewing our relationship to nature. For instance, Galileo and Torricelli rightly understood
that in order for physics to make progress, it had to abandon the idea of the scientist as a
passive observer of phenomena in favor of a model that made it possible for the scientist
to compel nature to respond to his specific questions on the basis of certain a priori
criteria or principles.26
Kant seemingly learned an important lesson from the new sciences, namely, that a
priori knowledge of objects is crucial for the formulation of a credible theory of
knowledge. Accordingly, he appropriated the revolutionary strategy in his quest to
overcome what he considered the scandal confronting metaphysics. Kant utilized the
resource of intellectual revolution to change the philosophical discussion, moving the
epistemological discussion beyond reason’s ability to grasp ultimate reality to focus,
instead, on the examination of the capacities of reason: “What and how much can the
understanding know apart from all experience?”27
Kant distinguishes his intellectual revolution from the previous ones by conceding
that human reason is limited. However, he argues that the resolution of the problem of
philosophy is contingent upon adopting reason as its highest principle. In this way, Kant
buys into the Cartesian view that philosophy has to begin with self-consciousness.
However, unlike Descartes, he does not reduce self-consciousness to the reflection of the
ego.28
Surely, the Copernican turn allows Kant the facility to specify the limits of reason
in terms of what cognitive claims are possible; devise the means of enabling reason to
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operate within its parameters, while specifying the antinomies that are generated when
thought is forced to transcend its limits;29 and make possible the investigation of the
conditions of knowledge.30 While the Copernican turn constitutes a rejection of what
Kant considers the inadequacies of his predecessors, it also signals an abandoning of his
earlier philosophical position held prior to his critical phase.
With the discovery of a new conceptual platform to rethink epistemology, Kant
believes that he has made it possible to eliminate the antinomies that traditional
metaphysics had produced. What is more, Kant thinks, he has, through an act of
synthesis, reconciled understanding and sensibility by allowing both to contribute to
knowledge in basically the same way: “Though all knowledge begins with experience, it
does not follow that it all arises out of experience.”31 Redding sums it up succinctly:
Experience and theory interpenetrate: as each can provide a reason for the
revision of the other, neither can play the role of ultimate foundation of the other.
Theoretical change may lead us to redescribe our experiences just as new
experiences may lead us to new theories.32
By limiting knowledge to the domain of appearance, and still assigning epistemological
function to thought, Kant believes he has proven against Hume that it is possible to have
a priori knowledge. Similarly, he claims to have demonstrated against Wolff that
knowledge is limited to the sphere of phenomenon.33
In the Preface to the Second Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
describes his Copernican revolution in the following way:
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Hitherto, it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But
all attempts to extend our knowledge by establishing something in regard to them
a priori, by means of concepts, have on this assumption, ended in failure. We
must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of
metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This
would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have
knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to
their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of
Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the
movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved
around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made
the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can
be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must
conform to the constitution of objects, I do not see how we could know anything
of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the
constitution of the faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a
possibility.34
By making the subject active vis-à-vis its cognitive object, Kant can be read as claiming
that his revolution proceeds along the lines of the hypothesis of Nicolaus Copernicus
(1473–1543), the Polish astronomer who triggered a new celestial mechanics in the
seventeenth century, and which was later developed by Galileo, Kepler, and Newton.
Kant’s conceptual revolution entails a couple of things. First, it indicates that Kant
makes understanding correlative with sensibility in furnishing the ground of knowledge.
Kant insightfully recognizes that the problem of knowledge cannot be resolved in terms
of a passive mind being affected by an active world. It should be stated, however, that
although Kant understands the cognitive relationship of thought to experience in mutually
inclusive rather than exclusive ways, he does not reduce one to the other. Nor does he
understand the relationship in question in terms of the relationship between matter and
form.35
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Second, Kant believes that his Copernican turn constitutes the discovery of a
priori conditions that make feasible the unification of practical and theoretical reason.36
Zeman explains it this way:
Proposing formal and not material idealism, Kant sought and believed himself to
have identified the universal and necessary principles in question as being
primarily the organizational structures of our experience, constitutive principles of
the framework of possible experience, and only in a derivative way as
characteristics to be ascribed to certain statements about the world as it is.37
To be sure, Kant’s so-called Copernican turn in philosophy represents a major
breakthrough that philosophy, prior to his joining the debate, so desperately needed but
that no one was able to provide.
How Copernican is Kant’s view? On the one hand, there seems to be agreement in
the literature that Kant’s Copernican turn bears no resemblance to the view of
Copernicus. On the other hand, there is disagreement among Fichte scholars over whether
or not the comparison is appropriate. Norman Kemp Smith, who exhibits tendencies of
hostility toward the critical system, flatly rejects Kant’s Copernicus’ analogy, claiming
that it is indefensible. By substituting a geocentric framework for a heliocentric one,
Smith argues, Copernicus purges astronomy of its anthropological elements. For his part,
Kant renders philosophy anthropological by making the object the product of the
cognitive subject. For Smith, Hume’s theory rather than Kant’s is Copernican. Kant’s
theory, on the contrary, due to its humanistic tendencies, is more akin to Greek thought
than the thought of Copernicus.38
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Ewing argues that Kant’s Copernican comparison is warranted even as he
concedes that the two positions are not alike. If I am right, unlike Smith, whose analysis
is driven by concerns of whether or not Kant’s views reflect an understanding of
Copernicus, Ewing bases his comments on the impact the analogy in question has had on
the entire philosophical enterprise. So long as Kant’s critical system transforms
philosophy the way Copernicus transformed astronomy, Ewing rightly maintains that the
comparison is warranted.39 Since the inauguration of his Copernican turn in philosophy,
Kant’s influence has shaped the philosophical thinking for several centuries, so much so
that it has been almost impossible to do philosophy without Kant.40 Popper agrees with
Ewing:
Even those who, like myself, cannot follow Kant all the way can accept his view
that the experimenter must not wait till it pleases nature to reveal its secrets, but
that he must question her. He must cross-examine nature in the light of his
doubts, his conjectures, his theories, and his inspirations. Here is a wonderful
philosophical find. It makes it possible to look upon science, whether theoretical
or experimental, as a human creation, and to look upon its history as part of the
history of ideas, on a level with the history of art or literature.41
Popper further holds Kant’s Copernican revolution significant not only for philosophy
but for the whole of science. According to him, by having the subject contribute to the
object of knowledge, Kant resolves the problem Copernicus created by denying the
human person his rightful place in the world.
Without specifically getting into issues of whether or not Kant’s analogy shows
an accurate understanding of Copernicus, I agree with Ewing and Popper that Kant
inaugurates a movement within philosophy that makes possible the unification of
39
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practical and theoretical reason, viewed from the point of view of practical thought. To be
sure, this view is revolutionary in light of the fact that no intellectual tradition was able to
achieve this prior to Kant. Additionally, this “changed point of view” (Umänderung der
Denkart) has gone on to inspire new philosophical positions, such as post-Kantian
German idealism and analytic philosophy. We will next consider the epistemological
import of Kant’s intellectual revolution.

1.3. The Epistemological Import of Kant’s Copernican Turn
The question could be raised: What is the epistemological import of the
Copernican revolution in philosophy? This question could be approached from a variety
of perspectives. For present purposes, I will review two insights that I am designating the
constructivist and the systematic. The constructivist perspective equates the Copernican
revolution with attempts by Kant to proffer a constructivist solution to the problem of
knowledge. By this is meant that Kant sees the subject as contributing to or shaping the
object it knows. For its part, the systematic perspective claims that Kant is interested in
the discovery of indubitable truth.
In a series of essays, Tom Rockmore offers a constructivist interpretation to
Kant’s project of the critique of pure reason. In particular, he thinks it is actually an
attempt by Kant to assess the extent to which representation (Vorstellung) represents.
According to Rockmore, though Kant initially formulates the problem of knowledge in
terms of representation, he later rejects a representationalist solution. Rockmore calls
attention to the Kantian dualism, which splits the world into the domains of appearance
and things in their objective existence, locating knowledge in the sphere of the former
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while denying the same to the latter. By electing to evaluate the subject/object
relationship from the point of view of the subject, and further denying reason access to
things-in-themselves, Rockmore explains that Kant privileges a constructivist solution to
the question of knowledge over the representationalist one.42
On the contrary, the systematic perspective construes the Copernican turn as the
search for indubitable truth. For instance, Peter Jonkers, who thinks Kant thought the
attainment of truth possible, cautions against overstretching the constructivist argument,
reminding us that even though Kant reverses the positions of the subject and the object in
an attempt to ground knowledge, he still holds onto a conceptual notion of subjectivity.
Therefore, according to Jonkers, subjectivity fulfills the role of an abstract
epistemological principle, with attendant implications for what it means for any rational
being to know as opposed to what a finite human being is actually capable of knowing.
Jonkers, who tries to understand Kant’s Copernican turn from the point of view of the
Enlightenment. Jonkers conjectures that Kant’s principle of abstract subjectivity may
have contributed to his conception of the categories of the understanding in universal
terms. As long as the status of the Kantian subject that constructs its object remains
conceptual, Jonkers maintains, it is possible, on Kant’s view, to “realize” objective
knowledge.43
The present inquiry comes down on the side of the constructivist insight in this
debate, for it is the position that enables me to establish a link between Kant and Fichte’s
position. But even more importantly, Kant is an important thinker in the history of

42

Tom Rockmore, “Remarks on the Structure of Twentieth century Philosophy,” Ars Disputandi; available
from http://www.ArsDisputandi.org/; Internet.
43
Peters Jonkers, “Perspectives on Twentieth Century Philosophy: A Reply to Rockmore,” Ars Disputandi;
available from http://www.ArsDisputandi.org/; Internet.

24
Western philosophy. And if the Copernican turn represents his greatest contribution to
philosophy, then such a contribution has to be something other than a mere restatement of
the views of traditional metaphysics. Specifically, if he rejects a representationalist
solution to the problem of knowledge, as is indeed the case, then the Copernican turn
could be construed as an indictment of his predecessors for making thought conform to
external standards. Knowledge on Kant’s account then is mediated rather than
immediate. This means that to know, in Kant’s view, is to know the contents of our mind
or consciousness, the condition of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever, and truth
becomes the function of our epistemological practice.
Although I side with the constructivist perspective, that is, I argue that Kant
proposes a constructivist solution to the question of knowledge by making reason
contribute to its object, I am not oblivious to Jonkers’s point of view. Jonkers reminds the
reader that Kant aimed to formulate a theory with universal implications, namely, what it
means for a rational being to have knowledge, and, hence retained the concept of logical
subjectivity. However, I am equally aware of the fact that the idea of finite subjectivity
that constitutes one of the hallmarks of post-Kantian German idealism was inspired by
Kant’s transcendental project, although Kant himself does not provide any. Apparently,
Kant completed The Critique of Pure Reason, his major piece on the critical theory
before the French Revolution altered our way of understanding the nature of the external
world, especially as it relates to us as an object of cognition. Quite understandably, he
was not able to incorporate its lessons in his system. One of the consequences of the
French Revolution was that it underscored the freedom of the individual human being in
the constitution of phenomenon. It challenged our traditional understanding of causality.
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The notion of finite subjectivity, suggested by Kant, begins with Fichte and finds its
highest expression in Hegel, and continues to inspire a historical approach to the problem
of knowledge even today.
Let me take the liberty to reiterate that Kant’s intellectual revolution represents a
major paradigm shift in philosophy, a paradigm shift that casts the thought/experience
relationship debate in new light, charting a new course for philosophy. By putting the
active subject at the center of everything, Kant frees the intellectual subject from the
inhibitions previously placed on it by traditional metaphysics. By acknowledging the role
of the subject in the constitution of phenomena Kant wishes to prove that only by creative
activity is scientific knowledge possible.
A couple of comments may be appropriate. First, it may be worthwhile
distinguishing between Kant’s system and the previous attempts to establish philosophy
as a systematic science, since it shares striking similarities with a few, for instance, the
position of John Locke, who had tried to create boundaries for reason in an act of
reflective self-criticism. Even though complimentary of Locke’s efforts to unify reason,
Kant blames Locke’s physiological approach for his failure to produce the intended
outcome.44 Kant contends that Locke failed because he did not utilize the critical method.
Bonevac argues that Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy constitutes his most important
contribution to the history of philosophy. Without that turn his theory merely mimics
those of his predecessors. He further maintains that Kant distinguishes his theory from
the previous intellectual traditions by standing his system on a different ground on the
basis of which he is able to specify what the mind is capable of comprehending.
According to Bonevac, by designating his theory transcendental, Fichte alludes to the
44
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focused nature of his approach as opposed to the general format adopted by his
predecessors.45
Second, although Kant opts for synthesis of cognition and sensibility rather than
the either/or approach of traditional metaphysics, one would be doing him a great
disservice by reducing his theory to a mere synthesis of concept and thought. It is
emphatically the case that in the critical project, rationalism and empiricism acquire new
significations, which is suggested by the very term critical, including Kant’s insistence
that the cognition of any object not given in cognition is impossible.

1.3.1 The Thing-in-itself and the Problem of Affection in Kant’s Critical
Philosophy
Before I turn attention to the immediate reception of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy, let me pause to look at the problem of dualism in Kant’s philosophical
thought. The problem of affection is the one aspect of Kant’s theory that shapes the
reception of his system. In a manner that seemingly undermines the revolutionary
character of his theory, which dissolves the dichotomy between understanding and
sensibility, Kant entertains a split between noumena and phenomena. He writes:
…that space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only conditions
of the existence of things as appearances: that, moreover, we have no concepts of
understanding and consequently no elements for the knowledge of things, save in
so far as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts; and that we can
therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it
is an object of sensible intuition, that is appearance…. But our further contention
must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these
objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them
as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion
that there can be appearance without anything that appears.46
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Kant wants to avoid having to provide an account of uncaused representation. But it also
enables him to restrict knowledge to the objects that are given in appearance.
By adopting a two-tiered world structure, Kant seems to follow the example of
Plato, who postulates the world of the Forms and the world of appearance, the mirror
image of the Forms. While Plato grants the person of nature and nurture access to the
sphere of the Forms, Kant takes his dualism in a different direction and makes the world
of things-in-themselves inaccessible to reason.47 For Kant, there is no way to ascertain
whether the phenomenal world truly corresponds to one that exists independently of us.
But it is enunciating the exact nature or the extent of the relationship between
noumena and phenomena that creates problems for Kant. In this regard, Kant merely
stutters and contradicts himself. For example, by limiting knowledge to the object of
sensation, Kant indicates that the categories of the understanding are applicable only to
the objects of appearance. However, Kant violates this cardinal principle of his critical
project by suggesting that the categories of the understanding may be employed beyond
phenomena. He asserts:
It would seem to follow that we cannot assert, what we have hitherto maintained,
that the pure modes of knowledge yielded by our understanding are never
anything more than principles of exposition of appearance, and that even in
their a priori application they relate only to the formal possibility of experience.
On the contrary, we should have to recognize that in addition to the empirical
employment of the categories, which is limited to sensible conditions, there is
likewise a pure and yet objectively valid employment. For a field quite different
from that of senses would lie open to us, a world which is thought as it were in
the spirit.48

47
48

Ibid., A 379.
Ibid., A 250.

28
To Kant’s readers, this sends mixed messages. I think the point at issue, as I understand
it, relates to what Kant considers to be the relationship of noumena to phenomena. While
one school of thought sees Kant to be suggesting a causal relationship between the two,
another school of thought brings what has come to be known as the double aspect
perspective to Kant’s view.
Ewing argues that Kant postulates the thing-in-itself in order to be able to provide
an account of what he calls the given element of our experience. Since we are thrown into
a world we merely discover but do not create, Kant may have intended his dualism,
especially his idea of things-in-themselves, according to Ewing, to explain the origin of
our empirical experiences by conceding that there is a mind-independent world that
affects the mind. For Ewing and, perhaps, others favoring a semi causal interpretation of
Kant, this has to be the case, otherwise there will be nothing to cause representation,
thereby reducing consciousness to self-consciousness. But Ewing is equally cognizant of
the problem this creates for Kant, and indicates that in order to refute dogmatism Kant
was willing to embrace principles that were clearly inconsistent with his overall critical
project.
By contrast, another school of thought adopts what is often called the double
aspect interpretation to the Kantian noumena/phenomena distinction, viewing the dualism
as the consideration of the same thing as is given in experience and as it is in itself.49 For
example, Henry Allison hypothesizes that the consideration of the object as it appears is
the consideration of the object of knowledge relative to its being presented to the mind in
intuition, while to consider an object as it is in itself is, according to Allison, to consider
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the object without reference to any sensible conditions. The thrust of the double aspect
approach is that phenomena and noumena are correlative concepts, and merely represent
two aspects of the same reality.
According to Allison, while Kant limits knowledge to the realm of appearance, he
still leaves open the possibility that in transcendental reflection one could have
knowledge of how objects must be constituted as they are in themselves.
Unlike Ewing, Allison does not think that this doctrine impacts Kant’s overall
philosophical position in a negative way. He argues that as long as the
noumena/phenomena dichotomy makes it possible for Kant to specify what must be
presupposed, in order for us to think or imagine things independently of all human
experience in their a priori status, then the dualism in question, according to Allison, does
not undermine the revolutionary character of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy.50
Both Ewing and Allison agree, however, that this indicates that even at the time
he was working out the details of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant was already looking
ahead to The Critique of Judgment, and The Critique of Practical Reason, respectively.
Implicit in this observation by Ewing and Allison is the idea that Kant needs a two-tiered
world structure in order to be able to argue for the existence of God, freedom, and
immortality of the soul. Additionally, both are open to the possibility that this aspect of
Kant’s theory rightly belongs to his moral rather than his theoretical philosophy.
It is my view, though, that there is textual support for both positions. There is
textual evidence to warrant a causal interpretation of Kant (for example, p. 28), see also
the following passage that renders his theory susceptible to a double aspect interpretation:
The transcendental Aesthetic, in all its teaching, has led to this conclusion; and
50
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the same conclusion also, of course, follows from the concept of an appearance in
general; namely, that something which is not in itself appearance must correspond
to it. For appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our mode of representation.
Unless, therefore, we are to move constantly in a circle, the word appearance must
be recognized as already indicating a relation to something, the immediate
representation of which is, indeed sensible, but which even apart from the
constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition must be
grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of
sensibility.51
In the former case, Kant does not only postulate noumena, he states that without thingsin-themselves there will be nothing to cause representation. While in the latter case, he
seems to downplay any serious causal relationship between things-in-themselves and
appearance, maintaining that, depending on the occasion, things-in-themselves may also
assume the identity of appearance.
As noted above, Kant struggles with the characterization of the relationship of
noumenon to phenomenon. On the one hand, he postulates an independent world in order
to avoid reducing consciousness to self-consciousness, and, consequently, escape the
charge that his theory is a variant of solipsism. On the other hand, he seems to blur the
cognition/sensibility distinction, describing their relationship in semantic terms. To be
sure the noumena/phenomena dichotomy creates problems for Kant’s theory, and, as we
will see shortly it is the first aspect of his theory to be abandoned by his critics and
followers alike. We will next examine the reception of Kant’s Copernican turn.

1.4. The Immediate Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy
Kant’s philosophy generated a wide range of reaction, ranging from outright
rejection to endorsement. Evidently, his contemporaries struggled with his enunciation of
the relationship of the subject to the cognitive object. In addition, they expressed
51
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frustration with the language and phraseology of the critical system, given the fact that
even traditional philosophical concepts were assigned new significations by Kant’s
critical method. For instance, for Kant, there exists a difference between transcendence
and transcendental. While the former connotes something beyond sensation, the latter
implies, in the context of his epistemology, the condition of the possibility of any
knowledge whatsoever. As could be seen in his correspondence with Christian Garve,
Kant did not feign ignorance about the sentiments of frustration occasioned by his theory.
In the letter in question, Kant writes:
I must admit that I have not counted on an immediately favorable reception of my
work. That could not be, since the expression of my ideas–ideas that I have been
working out painstakingly for twelve years in succession–was not worked out
sufficiently to be generally understandable. …people will get over the initial
numbness caused unavoidably by a mass of unfamiliar concepts and even more
unfamiliar language.52
Kant’s critics and followers alike were concerned about the opaque nature of his system,
including Moses Mendelssohn and Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Kant thought that
Mendelssohn would be the one to explain his system to the public. Even today, Kant’s
system continues to present a challenge to commentators.
More specifically, one school of thought dismissed the critical project as failing to
live up to its promise. Those who exhibited this attitude of hostility toward the critical
theory included Georg Hermann (1730–1788), Friederich Henrich Jacobi (1743–1819),
and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). As far as they were concerned, like the
previous attempts to unify thought, Kant’s system had proven incapable of yielding
conclusive results. In addition, they viewed Kant’s claim to have resolved the problem of
knowledge to the satisfaction of all a serious scandal.
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However, another school of thought developed a favorable attitude toward the
critical system, and was committed to carrying it forward not abandoning it. Those who
adopted a sympathetic approach to the critical method were Karl Leonhard Reinhold
(1757–1823), Johann Gotlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friederich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–
1854), and Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770–1831). Unlike Hermann, Herder and Jacobi,
who were dismissive of the critical philosophy, the followers of Kant, while they
conceded that Kant had done a poor job of communicating his theory to the public,
argued that the letter of his theory should be abandoned in order to save its spirit. In the
next section, I will review the reactions, of Jacobi and Reinhold. While the former is
critical of Kant’s efforts, the latter is supportive.

1.4.1 Friederich Henrich Jacobi
Jacobi was one of the early critics of the critical philosophy. Jacobi’s attack on
Kant was an unintended consequence of his involvement in the Spinozism controversy.
In his correspondence with Moses Mendelssohn, Jacobi alleged that the late poet and
critic Gothold Lessing had privately confessed to Spinozism, a charge Mendelssohn
denied.53 During the latter part of the eighteenth century, Spinozism came to symbolize
atheism. Spinoza was alleged to have eliminated the concept of a personal God by
equating God with the one substance of the world.54
Mendelssohn vehemently denied this charge, claiming that Jacobi’s comments
about his late friend were borne out of a misunderstanding and constituted a
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misrepresentation of Lessing’s views. If Pinkard is right, Jacobi’s comments were
nothing but a stunt meant to embarrass Mendelssohn, who was contemplating a tribute to
his late friend.55 Kant, whose support Jacobi sought in his disagreement with
Medelssohn, elected to remain neutral. Apparently disappointed by Kant’s neutrality
Jacobi launched an attack on the critical philosophy.56
Jacobi rejected the very idea of a transcendental analysis of reason, contending
that it was inconsistent with the notion of systematicity. Not only was the Critique of
Pure Reason incompatible with the idea of system, argued Jacobi, it also produced
“absurdities.”57 In particular, Jacobi rejected Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself,
accusing him of employing the noumena/phenomena dualism in order to escape the
charge of solipsism. He criticized Kant’s postulation of an active subject that shapes or
fashions the object of knowledge. He argues that this move slides the critical philosophy
into solipsism. As long as to know, in Kant’s view, is to know the contents of our mind or
the structures of consciousness, Jacobi maintained, his theory is a form of solipsism.
For Jacobi, neither appearance nor the thing-in-itself is the ground of
representation. If Kant continued to hold that objects of sensation are appearances, not
things-in-themselves, Jacobi noted that they could not be the cause of sensation.
Furthermore, Jacobi contends that things-in-themselves cannot be the cause of
representation either, since they are unknowable on Kant’s terms. Either way, Jacobi
maintains that Kant’s theory leads to skepticism. And if this is the case, then his claims to
have refuted Hume cannot be substantiated.
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1.4.2 Karl Leonhard Reinhold
Reinhold’s relationship to Kant is a reflection of the relationship of Kant to the
post-Kantian German idealist movement as a whole, which was by all intents and
purposes ambivalent, depending on what stage of German idealism is being considered.
Horstmann observes that in the aftermath of the inauguration of the critical system, the
post-Kantian German idealists were attracted to the critical system and considered
themselves Kantians. In the wake of the publication of Aenesidemus, they became his
critics, joining issues with the presentation of Kant’s theory. They were concerned that
Kant’s presentation left much to be desired. In undertaking to reconstruct the critical
philosophy, according to Horstmann, they were post-Kantian German idealists.
Distinguishing between the letter and the spirit of Kant’s view, the post-Kantian German
idealists maintained that the spirit (Geist) of Kant’s system was firmly established, while
its letter (Buchstabe) remained suspect.58
Though little known in the Western philosophical tradition, Reinhold is an
important figure in the modern philosophical tradition. He provides the link between
Kant and the subsequent philosophical discussion. In particular, he defines the character
that would be assumed by post-Kantian German idealism.
The former Catholic priest fled his native of Austria for Germany in 1783, where
he converted to Protestantism. Upon arrival, Reinhold acquired membership in the
Weimar circle whose membership also included Goethe, Wieland, and Herder. One of the
highlights of his association with this group is his siding with Herder in Herder’s dispute
with Kant. Kant criticized Herder’s system as lacking rigor and precision, especially his
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attempt to derive concepts from experience. Reinhold rose to the defense of Herder
against what he considered an unfair attack by Kant. Reinhold held Kant’s comments to
be misguided, accusing him of employing a priori criteria in his evaluation of Herder.
Reinhold argued that Kant seemed oblivious to the fact that Herder utilized the empirical
method in his evaluation of history, a fluid phenomenon, and therefore, it was unfair to
expect Herder to satisfy the requirements of rigor and precision. While a priori proofs
were necessary in metaphysics, maintained Reinhold, they were not necessary for the
analysis of history.59 Reinhold later abandoned the Weimar circle for the critical
philosophy.
Reinhold’s conversion to Kantianism occurred in the autumn of 1785 following
his reading of The Critique of Pure Reason. The appeal of Kant’s first Critique to
Reinhold was immediate and decisive; at once it dissolved the perceived tension between
faith and reason.60 On the one hand, Reinhold subscribed to Kant’s transcendental
method; on the other hand, he entertained misgivings about its presentation. Like other
philosophers of the post-Kantian German idealism persuasion, he was concerned that
despite Kant’s claim to have brought systematicity to philosophy, establishing it as a
science, there was little evidence to suggest that he had actually done so. Reinhold feared
that Kant’s system, as presented, was susceptible to a psychological interpretation.61
Hence, he embarked upon its revision in order to rid it of what he believed were its
ambiguities. With this self-imposed assignment, Reinhold assumed the role of expositor
of Kant.
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Reinhold’s explication of Kantianism was contained in his Letters on the Kantian
Philosophy (Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie). In this piece, he made the bold claim
that Kant had purged philosophy of the pretensions of traditional metaphysics, a claim
that was momentarily well received, especially by the followers of Kant. Reinhold
claimed that Jacobi’s attack on Kant was unjustified and grew out of a misreading of
Kant. Impressed by Reinhold’s effort, which he endorsed, Kant thanked him for making
the critical system available to the public in a simplified version.
Based on his newfound reputation as the author of Kantian letters, Reinhold was
appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Jena, a position he used in
propagating the tenets of the critical philosophy. Also, he was appointed coeditor of the
journal Der Teutsche Merkur, as well as reviewer of Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, a
Jena-based journal of literature edited by Gottlieb Schutz, the professor of rhetoric at the
University of Jena.
The underlying assumption driving Reinhold’s reconstruction of the critical
philosophy is that systematicity is coimplicatory with the identification of a self-evident
principle (Grundsatz) of philosophy, from which to deduce the entire philosophical
inquiry, including Kant’s system. Reinhold believed that the first principle in question
was presupposed by all other philosophical principles, including the facts of
consciousness and the faculties of the mind that formed the ground of Kant’s system. For
Reinhold, this approach transforms Kant’s system into a first philosophy, the
Elementarphilosophie. Ostensibly, Reinhold seeks to recast the critical philosophy to fit
the Cartesian ideal.
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Reinhold calls the first principle of his system the principle of consciousness (Satz
des Bewusstseins), which he formulates as follows: “Representation is distinguished in
consciousness by the subject from the subject and the object, and is referred to both.”
Implicit in this formulation is the idea that a theory of consciousness distinguishes the
subject from its object but also the representation, which the subject distinguishes from
both itself and the object. Similarly, the theory relates the representation to both the
subject and the object.62
To be sure, Reinhold’s original intent has changed. Although his stated objective
was the revision of the critical method, his strategy clearly shows an abandoning of his
master’s transcendental analysis of reason for an examination of the possibility of
representation. What is more, he substitutes Kant’s analytic-deductive method for a
synthetic-deductive one. Ameriks remarks that Reinhold’s reduction of consciousness to
representation may have been caused by his association with Leibniz, whose student he
reportedly was at some point.63
Reinhold’s theory remained a system in evolution. Although he initially claimed
to have facilitated the critical principle in fulfilling the requirement of systematicity,
Reinhold later abandoned his Elementarphilosophie for Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, a
theory he partially inspired. After a brief stint with Fichte, he switched to the theory of
Jacobi before finally becoming a disciple of Bardili.64
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A couple of comments may suffice. First, Reinhold’s exposition of the critical
project popularized Kant’s system by restating it in the language of the Enlightenment, an
exposition that determined the manner and approach of post-Kantian German idealism.
For example, while it is true that it was Kant’s reconciliation of thought and experience
that propelled Fichte toward the critical method, it could be reasonably inferred that it
was Kantianism as passed on by Reinhold that contributed to the emergence of Fichte’s
original philosophical position. Second, it was Reinhold’s formulation of the critical
system that caught the attention of Schulze the skeptic, and which triggered Schulze’s
skeptical assault on the critical system.
Suffice it to say that Kant’s critical system and, indeed the German idealism
tradition, continues to generate intense and interesting debate even in contemporary
philosophical discussions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the exchange between
analytic philosophy and its Continental counterpart. Analytic philosophy charges that the
contribution of idealism to the history of Western philosophy is exaggerated.
Analytic philosophy is a movement that began at the universities of Oxford and
Cambridge with the main aim of undermining the principles of transcendental idealism,
especially in its Kantian and Hegelian formulations. Analytic philosophy takes issue with
the fact that transcendental idealism dissolved the tension between subjectivity and
objectivity. The leaders of this so-called rebellion were (Bertrand Russell (1872–1970)
and G. E. Moore (1873–1958). As reported by Moser Russell proudly identifies with this
effort:
It was toward the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and
Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the
first published account of the new philosophy was Moore’s article in Mind
(1899) on the “Nature of Judgment”. Although neither he nor I would now adhere
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to all the doctrines in this article, I, and I think he, would still agree with its
negative impact–i.e., with the doctrine that fact is in general independent of
experience.65
For his part, G. E. Moore in his essay, “The refutation of Idealism,” argues that
throughout history, attempts to make thought and experience contribute to knowledge
have been self-contradictory. He writes:
It is a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that necessary truths in
general, but especially those of which it is said that the opposite is inconceivable,
have been commonly supposed to be analytic, in the sense that the proposition
denying them was self-contradictory. It was in this way, commonly supposed,
before Kant, that many truths could be proved by the law of contradiction alone.66
Moore and Russell reject attempts by transcendental idealism to overcome the dichotomy
between the subject and the object.
Fueling this stance of hostility toward idealism is the erroneous but influential
view that idealism denies the existence of the external world. It may be recalled that,
following Kant, the post-Kantian German idealists dismiss the approach of transcendental
realism as incapable of resolving the problem of knowledge. The cause of the critical
system has not been enhanced by its opaque character either. Claiming that the
contributions of transcendental idealism have been grossly exaggerated, analytic
philosophy has sought to return philosophy to its so-called eternal foundations by
employing the empiricist approach to philosophy in order to prove the existence of
objects in space, with the purpose of undermining the claims of idealism.
Moore, for whom knowledge is not possible outside the framework of the law of
contradiction, argues that by making the subject correlative with the object, idealism
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violates an important principle of the law of contradiction.67 The law of contradiction
states that one cannot be simultaneously asleep and awake. Moore finds idealism guilty
of failing to distinguish between, for instance, yellow and the sensation of yellow,
insisting that sensation is tied to thought and any suggestion that thought enters the
essence of reality should be resisted.
By contrast, Continental philosophy argues that the period between Kant and
Hegel represents one of the more productive ones in the history of the Western
philosophical tradition, more productive in terms of the adherents and critics it has
produced, as well as the quality of debates and philosophical traditions it has inspired,
which include analytic philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology, etc.68
In the wake of Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy, Continental
philosophy does not see how any meaningful philosophical inquiry can ignore the role of
the human agent in the search for knowledge. Although it acknowledges that it is
impossible to avoid foundations in philosophy, Continental philosophy seeks to convince
philosophy to expand its horizon to include the transcendental constitution of the person.
The protagonists of this approach include, according to Henrich, Charles Taylor, A. V.
Miller, and H. S. Harris.

Conclusion
This chapter examines Kant’s transcendental idealism and its immediate reception
as a way of gaining access to the thought of Fichte. The genius of Kant consists in his
ability to move the epistemological discussion beyond the empiricism/rationalism debate,
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thereby setting metaphysics on a new path. Kant proposes a new way of understanding
the relationship of the subject to the cognitive object. His strategy makes the object the
dependent variable of the subject, which makes it possible for object to exist in the first
place. In the critical enterprise, subjectivity and objectivity both contribute to knowledge
in the same way. This is the only way forward for metaphysics, according to Kant, if it is
to continue to remain relevant to the epistemological debate. Without this approach, Kant
fears that metaphysics proves incapable of dealing with the issue of knowledge.
Also, this chapter looks at the reaction generated by Kant’s critical theory. While
one insight dismisses the critical project as a failure, incapable of yielding conclusive
outcomes, another is drawn to it. The former position represents the view of Hermann,
Herder, and Jacobi, while the latter is that of the post-Kantian German idealists, such as
Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. More specifically, this chapter rehearses the
reaction of Jacobi and Reinhold.

Chapter Two
The Evolution of Fichte’s Original Philosophical Insight: The Wissenschaftslehre
Introduction
This chapter will attempt to gain an understanding into Fichte’s original
philosophical system, the Wissenschaftslehre, with a primary focus on his doctrine of
positing. Fichte names his original philosophical theory the Wissenschaftslehre, a
designation he invokes in claiming that his philosophical view is consistent with Kant’s
transcendental project, as well as claim that his view provides the requisite systematicity
that philosophy so desperately needs but no philosophical system prior to his own,
including Kant’s, has been able to provide.
Ordinarily, it is a daunting task coming to grips with an original philosophical
system, as the nuances of such a view may resist the full grasp of the originator of the
system in question and its interpreters alike.1 It is particularly cumbersome coming to
terms with Fichte’s philosophical view. Admittedly, Fichte’s theory is by all accounts
complex, perhaps lacking inner cohesion, even as he vigorously complains that his
philosophical position has been misunderstood, further insisting that if viewed from the
point of view of the whole rather than its disparate individual parts his system
is coherent.2
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In addition to the fact that Fichte was not a good writer, his other problems were
seemingly self-made. For example, he has the tendency to employ terminology or
concepts hitherto unknown in critical philosophy without offering any clarification or
justification. What is more, his problem may further have been exacerbated by the hasty
manner in which the initial formulation of his position occurred.
Named Reinhold’s successor as the chair of the philosophy department at Jena in
1794, Fichte had a mixed reaction; although excited about the offer, he also had his
reservations about it. While excited about the prospect of a full-time employment
opportunity, Fichte was concerned about not having an original philosophical system that
would serve as guide for his lectures. Consequently, he sought to delay the start of his
employment at Jena by one year in order to work out the details of his theory, whose
foundation he discovered in the course of the review of Aenesidemus. His request for a
postponement was denied, however, forcing Fichte to hurriedly publish a draft of his
system which was initially presented to a group of politicians and pastors in Zurich in
1794.3 That Fichte was dissatisfied with the initial enunciation of his theory is suggested
by the fact that his philosophical view underwent series of fundamental changes during
the course of his professional career. Although it was originally intended to fulfill
employment criteria and advertise his classes at Jena,4 driven by financial considerations,
Fichte decided to make the initial version of his system, whose details were to emerge
from lecture to lecture during the course of the semester, available to the public.5
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This speaks to the fact that it is not possible to provide a general characterization
of Fichte’s entire philosophical position. Hence, my intention here is to sketch his
original philosophical view with a stress on his concept of positing as an aspect of his
wider philosophical view. In particular, I will defend the position that Fichte invokes the
technical term positing in his quest to offer a characterization of self-consciousness, the
subject’s awareness of its awareness of its role also as its object. In the aftermath of
Kant’s so-called Copernican turn in philosophy, the realization that self-consciousness is
crucial for the grounding of knowledge became widespread.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section offers an
account of Fichte’s discovery of his vocation as a philosopher. The second section looks
at Aenesidemus, the skeptical attack on the critical edifice, which not only confirmed
Fichte’s private reservations about the letter of the critical system, but was significantly
instrumental to the conception of his original philosophical insight. The final section
examines positing as the cardinal principle of Fichte’s philosophical position. Following
the example of Descartes and Kant, Fichte discovers a self-evident principle of
philosophy that leads to the identification of the initial ground of his epistemology that
posits itself as both the subject and the object of knowledge.

2.1. Fichte’s Path to Kantianism
Fichte was born in 1762 in Rammenau, Saxony. The young Fichte’s initial
academic endeavors were supported variously by the local minister, Johann Gottfried
Dinndorf, and a wealthy benefactor, Baron von Miltitz. Fichte caught the attention of
Baron von Miltitz by reproducing a Sunday homily preached earlier in the day for the
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benefit of the baron.6 Impressed by his performance, Miltitz offered Fichte a scholarship,
which made it possible for him to attend regional schools, and which was later
instrumental to his enrollment at the University of Leipzig for theology.7 However,
Fichte’s enrollment at Leipzig was short-lived as he was forced to discontinue his
academic program on account of the death of his benefactor, which resulted in the loss of
his scholarship.
Now a school dropout, and evidently limited in terms of gainful employment
opportunities, Fichte resorted to private tutoring for his sustenance, something he
abhorred. It was while occupying the position of private tutor in Zurich that Fichte had
the chance to read Rousseau and Montesquieu, as well as to become acquainted with the
ideals of the French Revolution, especially its stress on liberty.8 Ironically, it was within
the context of something he resented that Fichte came to discover his calling as a
philosopher.
Fichte’s conversion to philosophy occurred under accidental circumstances in the
summer of 1790, following his reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. The occasion was
his engagement by a university student who needed help understanding Kant’s
transcendental thought. Unlike Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who was already grounded in
the critical system and had actually undertaken its exposition and reformulation, Fichte
was a novice with respect to the critical edifice at the time of his hire as a tutor. However,
motivated by financial considerations, he accepted the challenge and immediately went to
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work.9 As he immersed himself in Kant’s critical thought, the initial element of necessity
that propelled him toward Kant’s theory was replaced by one of “genuine enthusiasm,”
triggering an intellectual revolution in Fichte’s thought. For instance, writing to his
childhood friend, Weisshuhn, in the immediate aftermath of his discovery of the critical
system, Fichte describes the joy of his philosophical find:
I have been living a new world ever since reading The Critique of Practical
Reason. Propositions which I thought could never be overturned have been
overturned for me. Things have been proven to me which I thought could never
be proven–for example, the concept of freedom, the concept of duty, etc.–and I
feel all the happier for it. It is unbelievable how much respect for mankind and
how much strength this system gives us! You will have long since felt this, just as
I do now…. Please forgive me for saying so, but I cannot convince myself that
prior to the Kantian Critique anyone able to think for himself thought any
differently than I did, and I do not recall ever having met anyone who had any
fundamental objections to make against my (previous) system. I encountered
plenty of sincere persons who had different–not thought but different feelings.
Thus I was deceived by the apparent consistency of my previous system, and thus
are thousands of persons perhaps still being deceived. … I have now thrown
myself completely into the Kantian philosophy–at first out of necessity, but then
with genuine enthusiasm.10
The above correspondence indicates the nature and the extent of Kant’s influence
on Fichte, and further specifies how Fichte himself understood that influence. For better
or for worse, Kant exposed the inadequacy of the philosophical propositions Fichte had
previously believed to be firmly entrenched. In particular, Kant’s successful defense of
the primacy of practical reason in the constitution of knowledge dissolved in Fichte’s
thought, once and for all, the perceived dichotomy between critical rationality and
emotional spontaneity.
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Like his contemporaries, including Kant, Fichte confronted a dilemma concerning
the relation of freedom to necessity, understood at the time to be necessarily adversarial.
For example, Jacobi reportedly indicates the crisis that Fichte and his contemporaries
would have confronted but would have been unable to resolve. In the work in question,
Jacobi reportedly characterizes the relationship of faith to reason in conflictual terms.
Since faith and reason are necessarily antithetical to each other, in Jacobi’s view, the two
could be employed only in mutually exclusive ways if the world is to be properly
understood. On the basis of this thesis, Jacobi reportedly offers the individual the choice
of either unreasoned faith or reasoned atheism not both at the same time.11
Fichte was initially schooled in the Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalistic system of
philosophy, the dominant intellectual tradition of eighteenth-century Germany and was,
prior to his conversion to the critical philosophy, committed to metaphysical determinism
in its eighteenth-century form. This sought to apply:
to human behavior the mechanistic principle of causation with which modern
science, inspired by Newton’s explanation of motion was constructing a physical
universe of regular, predictable laws, like the working of the physical universe,
were reducible to actions and reactions within a chain of sufficient causes. The
result was an uncompromising environmentalism, applied to the ideas as well as
to actions that reduced rationality to an “epiphenomenon of natural causality.”
Thought was the product of sense experience, which was itself caused by external
stimuli.12
But it was determinism, according to LaVopa, as enunciated by Carl Ferdinand Hommell,
the professor of natural and criminal law at the University of Leipzig that caught the
attention of Fichte. Hommell reportedly sought to fuse together determinism with the
Lutheran understanding of predestination. LaVopa indicates that Hommell held that
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freedom had to be supported by the higher wisdom of providence. Otherwise personal
accountability remained a mirage, something that potentially undermined the concepts of
reward and punishment. It also destroyed the state’s moral basis for enforcing order.13
In relation to Fichte’s philosophical position, the influence of Lutheran theology
cannot be ignored either. Fichte was raised in the Lutheran pietist tradition that sought to
revise Christianity by eliminating its ritualistic and dogmatic tendencies. Although not
known to have held or articulated any original philosophical doctrine, the Lutheran pietist
tradition’s preference for emotions inclines it toward the empiricist approach to
philosophy rather than rationalism.
In the immediate aftermath of his discovery of Kantianism, still savoring the
sweetness of his discovery, Fichte sought a meeting with Kant. He probably would have
envisioned the benefits of such an encounter to include the winning of Kant’s
acquaintanceship as well as the possibility of studying under the master, something that
had the potential to enhance his standing in philosophical circles.14 To this end, he
traveled to Königsberg in the summer of 1791. He had his wish granted, and was
received in audience by Kant. However, the outcome of the meeting was far from
satisfying for Fichte; he was clearly disappointed by the rather cold reception accorded
him, as Kant reportedly appeared reportedly drowsy during their meeting.
Determined more than ever to bring himself to the notice of Kant, Fichte hurriedly
composed a draft entitled An Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (Versuch einer
Kritik aller Offenbarung), which was clearly influenced by Kant’s views. According to
Copleston, the Attempt anticipated Kant’s liberal views on religion, and represented
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Fichte’s attempts to distinguish between theology and religion, maintaining that for
Fichte they were not one and the same. Copleston notes that Fichte espouses a notion of
God that presupposes acknowledgment of his power over nature without necessarily
identifying him with any organized religion.15
The effect of Fichte’s strategy was immediate and profound. Impressed by his
brilliance, especially his demonstrated familiarity with the concepts and phraseology of
the critical method, Kant arranged a second meeting with Fichte. The efficacy of the
second meeting is indicated by the fact that Kant played a prominent role in the
publishing of Fichte’s An Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation. Also, on the strength
of Kant’s recommendation, Fichte secured a teaching position in Danzig, near Krakow.
Fichte’s luck continued to shine. His Attempt appeared in 1792 without the name
of its author, and was immediately but mistakenly greeted as Kant’s anticipated piece on
religion, prompting positive and generous reviews. In the ensuing confusion surrounding
the authorship of the work in question, Kant distanced himself from the work and
identified Fichte as its author. However, the positive reviews the book received could not
be withdrawn. Thus, an anonymous piece on religion, couched in the language of the
critical system, published by Kant’s publisher, was all that Fichte needed to introduce
himself to the world as a philosopher of consequence. For the first time, Fichte had a
wide array of employment opportunities staring at him.
For example, based on his reputation as the author of An Attempt at a Critique of
All Revelation, Fichte was selected as Reinhold’s replacement when the latter suddenly
resigned his appointment as the chair of the philosophy department at the University of
Jena in 1794. He was also appointed a contributor to the journal Allgemeine Literatur
15
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Zeitung. Fichte’s appointment as contributor to Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung is
significant on a variety of fronts. For example, he would be mandated by Allgemeine
Literatur Zeitung to formulate a response to Aenesidemus, the skeptical assault on
transcendental philosophy, an assignment that would force him to rethink his allegiance
to the critical system, and which would eventually lead him to the conception of his
original philosophical program. We will look at Aenesidemus next.

2.2 Aenesidemus: A Synopsis
Although published anonymously in 1792, under the title “Aenesidemus, oder
über Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten
Elementarphilosophie nebst einer Verteidigung gegen die Anmaassungen der
Vernunftkritik” (Concerning the Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Propounded
in Jena by Professor Reinhold, including a Defense of Skepticism Against the Pretensions
of the Critique of Pure Reason), Aenesidemus was identified as the work of Gottlob Ernst
Schulze (1761–1833), the professor of philosophy at the University of Helmstadt and,
after the disbanding of that university, the University of Göttingen.
Apparently, Aenesidemus was a combination of several factors. For instance, as
the title of the write-up suggests, Schulze drew inspiration from Aenesidemus, the first
century BC skeptic. But he was also influenced by neo-Humean skepticism, whose
membership also included scholars such as Salomon Maimon, Ernst Platner, and A. W.
Rehberg. Members of the neo-Humean skeptical philosophical system described Kant as
a “skeptical idealist,” accusing him of endorsing a view he claims to refute. They argued
that Kant’s noumena/phenomena distinction, especially his claim that things-in-
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themselves are unknowable, makes him a skeptic. Correspondingly, this stance
undermines his claims to have refuted Hume. Not to be forgotten is the fact that
Schulze’s brand of skepticism also had a moral underpinning to it. He believed in the
perfectability of human reason, something he thought was made possible by the concept
of striving. This explains why Schulze would take exception to any suggestion of
impossibility or fully constituted reality that prohibited or eliminated the idea of striving.
Cast in the style of an exchange between Hermias, an admirer of the critical
philosophy, and its opponent, Aenesidemus, Schulze embarks upon the project of
convincing his interlocutor about the impotence of transcendental idealism as a
philosophical system. His primary target was Reinhold, since he was believed to have
inoculated the critical system against skepticism. But Aenesidemus also had Kant in
view. His strategy was to convince his interlocutor that the critical theory failed on
several fronts. We will review some of the skeptic’s criticisms.
First, Schulze objects to Reinhold’s attempt to anchor philosophy on a unitary
principle of philosophy, the principle of consciousness. Schulze accuses Reinhold of
reducing everything that goes on in the human mind to representation by relating
representation to the subject and the object and by distinguishing it from both. The
skeptic rejects Reinhold’s attempt to make the principle of consciousness the highest
principle of philosophy, insisting that it is subordinate to the principle of contradiction
(Satz des Widerspruchs).16 Contrary to Reinhold’s conjecture, the skeptic maintains that
the principle of consciousness is anything but clear. For Aenesidemus distinction and
relation are open to several interpretations. Therefore, distinction and relation are
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ambiguous. Schulze further argues that the principle of consciousness does not cover all
consciousness, for example, intuition (Anschauung). By virtue of being open to several
interpretations, Aenesidemus contends, the principle of consciousness is “probable” and
“arbitrary” rather than “certain” or “universal” as claimed by Reinhold.17
Schulze next attacks Reinhold for suggesting a causal relationship between the
faculty of representation (Voerstellungsvermögen) and representation (Vorstellung) itself,
i.e., representation is related to the faculty of representation as effect to cause. He states:
It is, therefore, simply incomprehensible whence the Philosophy of the Elements
obtains the right in laying down the foundation to apply the categories of cause
and actuality to a suprasensible object, viz., to a particular faculty of
representation which is neither intuitable nor given to any experience.18
Schulze conjectures that for maintaining that the relationship of the faculty of
representation to representation is causal, Reinhold violates an important principle of the
critical system, which prohibits the application of the categories of the understanding to
objects that are not given in appearance. Kant claims that objects are knowable only if
they are given in appearance.
Third, the skeptic targets the dualism characteristic of Kant’s exposition of the
critical method and maintains that it renders Kant’s position unsatisfactory. Kant splits
the world into the realms of appearance and things-in-themselves, restricting knowledge
to the domain of appearance while denying the same to the sphere of things-inthemselves. What was Fichte’s response to these criticisms? We will find out.
Before we get to Fichte’s response, however, a few issues deserve mention. First,
although it was a restatement of objections raised against the critical system by earlier
critics, for example Jacobi and Maimon, Aenesidemus, owing to the fact that it was well
17
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written, caught the attention of the friends and critics of the critical philosophy alike. For
the defenders of Kant, it needed to be taken seriously.
Second, as a professed Kantian, Fichte thought he had an obligation to the critical
system, including a defense in the face of the skeptical assault by Schulze. He quite
correctly understood that any attack on transcendental philosophy potentially undermined
his position, especially as it was becoming clear that the attacks were beginning to take
their toll on the critical method. He states:
The reviewer has felt duty-bound to assess this book in detail, in part because it
really does contain many good and apt remarks; in part because the author has
complained in advance about the unproved verdicts (of which it is hoped, he will
not accuse this reviewer); in part because this book has actually attracted some
attention here and there, and some readers are said to have concluded from it that
the Critical Philosophy is a lost cause; in part, finally, to help certain people
overcome the prejudice of thinking that the objections to the Kantian philosophy
have not been properly appreciated and that one would just as soon forget about
them, since one has no well-founded reply to make to them. This reviewer wishes
for nothing more fervently than that his assessment might contribute toward
convincing a good many independent thinkers that the Critical Philosophy, in
itself and in its inner content, still stands as firmly as ever.19
Third, Fichte had come to believe, at least initially, that Reinhold had provided
the critical theory with a firm foundation capable of refuting skepticism, a belief that had
to be reevaluated in the wake of Aenesidemus.

2.2.1 The Review of Aenesidemus
Fichte’s Aenesidemus review represents the first major attempt by any member of
the German idealism tradition to respond to the skeptical objections against the critical
philosophy.20 It also represents the first real attempt by a member of the tradition to
radicalize Kant’s modest transcendental analysis of reason.21
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Fichte’s qualification for the review of Aenesidemus was not in doubt. At the time
of the publication of Aenesidemus, he was widely believed to be the leading Kantian,
sentiments he too shared. Second, Fichte and Schulze, the author of Aenesidemus, were
not new to each other; their relationship dated back to their school days at Pforta and
Wittenberg. Prior to the appearance of Aenesidemus, their relationship had turned frosty,
perhaps characterized by personal animosity due to what Fichte considered Schulze’s
mean-spirited review of his An Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation. Yet the
importance of the task at hand, namely, the review of Aenesidemus, was not lost on
Fichte. Even though there was no love lost between himself and Schulze, he knew he was
not going to allow the sentiments of personal animosity to get in the way of such an
important task. Similarly, he was fully aware that a credible response to the skeptic
required a better approach than a mere restatement of loyalty to Kant. So what was
Fichte’s reaction?
First, Fichte agrees with and yet disagrees with Aenesidemus. On the one hand,
Fichte subscribes to Reinhold’s idea of basing philosophical inquiry on a self-evident
principle known to be true. On the other hand, he rejects Reinhold’s designee, the
principle of consciousness, claiming that it is inadequate as the highest ground of
philosophy. Instead, Fichte proposes to derive philosophical inquiry and, for that matter,
Reinhold’s principle of consciousness, from a still higher principle: “The principle of
consciousness is a theorem which is based upon another first principle, from which,
however, the principle of consciousness can be derived a priori and independently of all
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experience”22 Specifically, Fichte proposes to derive the principle of consciousness from
the principles of identity (A=A) and opposition (A=-A). In this way, he partially sides
with Schulze against Reinhold-partial in the sense that he, similarly, rejects the skeptic’s
candidate, the principle of contradiction, as equally insufficient.
Fichte next looks at Schulze’s criticism of Reinhold’s postulation of the faculty of
representation as the cause of representation. Fichte calls into question the accuracy of
the skeptic’s reading of this aspect of Reinhold’s view, suggesting that Schulze’s account
constitutes a mischaracterization of Reinhold’s view. Although Fichte thinks that
Reinhold’s views are misrepresented (which, by the way, look Reinholdian to me) he
does not state what Reinhold’s correct view is. Instead, he proceeds to state his position
on the doctrine of representation: “The faculty of representation exists for the faculty of
representation through the faculty of representation.”23 By this formulation, Fichte
reveals two important characteristics of the human mind, namely, self-referentiality and
circularity.
Fichte then ventures into the most controversial aspect of Kant’s view, the thingin-itself/appearance relationship, and the problem of affection it raises. Fichte upholds the
skeptic’s objections, claiming that the Kantian dualism, especially its inherent suggestion
that the relationship of noumenon to phenomenon is similar to that of cause to effect,
sends the critical system into dogmatism. Although Kant’s project hopes to escape
dogmatism, by postulating a thing-in-itself as the causal agent of things given in
appearance, Fichte concludes that the skeptic’s concerns are valid.
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Fichte’s review of Aenesidemus took at least a year, a little longer than expected,
a clear indication that Schulze’s objections were not easily dismissable. Evidently, his
assignment put him in the awkward position of having to make significant concessions to
Schulze, and yet insisting upon the tenability of the critical system. On the whole, the
impact of Aenesidemus on Fichte is indicated by the following correspondence with
Stephani:
Have you read Aenesidemus? It has perplexed me for some time now. It has
overthrown Reinhold in my eyes, has made me suspicious of Kant, and has
overturned my whole system from the ground up. One cannot live under the open
sky. It cannot be helped; the system must be rebuilt. And this is what I have been
faithfully doing for the past six weeks or so. Come celebrate the harvest with me.
I have discovered a new foundation, on the basis of which it will be easy to
develop the whole of philosophy. Kant’s philosophy, as such is correct–but only
in its results and not in its reasons…. I believe that in a few more years we shall
have a philosophy which is just as self-evident as geometry. What consequences
do you think this will have for mankind? We have no wish to conceal the
lamentable state of contemporary philosophy–as is only too well demonstrated
by recent controversies concerning freedom and by the misunderstandings among
the critical philosophers themselves. From the point of view of the new standpoint
I have reached, these controversies concerning freedom appear ridiculous. It is
amusing when Reinhold tries to make everything that happens in the human soul
into a representation. Anyone who does this can know nothing of freedom and the
practical imperative.24
Within that same time frame, Fichte shared similar concerns with other associates, for
example, Flatt and Reinhard.
Surely, Aenesidemus had triggered a second intellectual revolution in Fichte’s
thought. In comparison to the first intellectual revolution, the conversion to
transcendental philosophy, the revolution occasioned by Schulze is more significant, even
though the former is prior to the latter chronologically, because the latter has a more
direct bearing on the evolution of Fichte’s original philosophical system. Specifically,
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Schulze led Fichte to the realization that transcendental philosophy in its Kantian and
Reinholdian presentations remained an unfinished project and, therefore, stood in need of
revision if it was to answer its critics. Like Kant, Fichte came to distinguish between the
letter and the spirit of the critical theory, maintaining that the letter of the theory had to be
abandoned in order to save its spirit. Fichte further suggested that the skeptical objections
were sustainable against the letter but failed against the spirit of Kant’s view.
It is worthy of note that even at the time of the review of Aenesidemus, when
Fichte was supposedly preoccupied with the formulation of a defense for the critical
theory against the skeptical objections raised by attacks launched by Schule, he was
already thinking of his original philosophical position. Understood in this way, the case
could be rightly made that Aenesidemus, which Fichte credits with disrupting his
Kantianism, merely confirmed the misgivings he privately entertained about the letter of
the critical view, which gives credence to Pinkard’s thesis. Pinkard rightly observes that
Fichte was aware of the implications of conceding the more serious objections to the
skeptic; he knew, Pinkard suggests, that by so doing he would be undermining the
positions of Kant and Reinhold while paving the way for the emergence of his
Wissenschaftslehre.25

2.3. Positing as the Hallmark of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
Fichte’s account of the positing activity of the self is presupposed by his
insistence that philosophy should be deduced from an initial ground known to be true:
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“Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all
human knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, if it is to be an absolutely
primary principle.26 In Fichte’s view, systematic rigor in any system depends on the
ability to show that the system in question is deduced from a fundamental principle.
Fichte maintains that since his science of knowledge is the science of science, knowledge
of knowledge, it must be derived from a unitary ground. Otherwise, it would seem to
suggest that there could be more than one system of knowledge, something he manifestly
rejects.
In the early Jena period, Fichte simply states that philosophy should proceed from
a secure ground without revealing its identity. However, Henrich identifies the principle
in question as the subjective principle, and contends that Fichte first provided the hint
about his desire to erect philosophy on the principle of the self while visiting Kant in
Königsberg, and later reiterated this intent in the course of his conversation with Schultz.
Henrich thinks that even though this idea emerged very early in his thought, Fichte
lacked the theoretical potential to articulate it at the time, and that he went public with his
proposition only in the wake of the review of Aenesidemus when he acquired the
confidence to defend or articulate it. 27
By offering to deduce philosophy from the principle of subjectivity, Fichte has
demonstrated who he is-since one’s approach to the problem of knowledge is necessarily
tied to “what sort of man one is:”
What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one
is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we can reject or
26
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accept as we wish; it is rather something animated by the soul of the person who
holds it. A person indolent by nature or dulled and distorted by mental servitude,
learned luxury and vanity will never raise himself to the level of idealism.28
If philosophy is called upon to furnish the ground of experience (Erfahrung) as Fichte
believes to be the case, then one is faced with two possible philosophical approaches,
idealism and dogmatism. According to Fichte, the two possible systems of philosophy are
distinguished from one another by their understanding of how a philosophical system
should be constituted: whether it should be grounded on the principle of the self or the
principle of the thing. Fichte explains the difference this way:
The essence of the critical philosophy consists in this, that an absolute self is
postulated as wholly unconditioned and incapable of determination by any higher
thing; and if this philosophy is derived in due order from the above principle, it
becomes a science of knowledge. Any philosophy is, on the other hand,
dogmatic, when it equates or opposes anything to the self as such; and this it does
in appealing to the supposedly higher concept of the thing (ens), which it thus
quite arbitrary set up as the absolutely highest conception.29
In Fichte’s view, his Wissenschaftslehre, which proceeds by way of idealism, grounds its
inquiry on the self (Ich) the principle of freedom. On the contrary, dogmatism takes as
the starting point of its investigation the thing, the principle of transcendence.30 Fichte
seems convinced that, even though neither idealism nor dogmatism can refute the other
on its terms, the person who is conscious of freedom will always choose idealism, while
the one who cherishes nature over freedom would opt for dogmatism.
Fichte thinks that in order to prove the efficacy of his idealistic philosophical
system, he needs to show that dogmatism is an impotent system of philosophy.
Consistent with this agenda, he presents idealism as having a speculative advantage over
dogmatism, a superiority that is proven in the actual construction of the two systems.
28
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Fichte’s conviction concerning the superiority of idealism is grounded in the belief that it
is the only philosophical system that is capable of exhibiting the “presence of
consciousness of the freely acting intellect, which is the basis of experience.”31 In
Fichte’s view, our ability to demonstrate our claims to knowledge is tied to something
that is internal rather than external; we are better off explaining the outside world on the
basis of what is within rather than the other way around. In Fichte’s view, only idealism
can prove the “essence” of the self, which is its ability to posit itself as something
existent.
Conversely, according to Fichte, dogmatism fails as an epistemological paradigm,
precisely because it cannot demonstrate its claims to know. Fichte attributes the failure of
dogmatism to its willingness to make immodest and arrogant claims. Fichte fears that by
holding outlandish claims about the ability of human reason to fully grasp objective
reality as it is in itself, the dogmatist philosopher ignores the fallibility of thought.
Consequently, according to Fichte, the dogmatist philosopher leaves the mind completely
dependent on external space, so much so that space is unaffected by what the mind
does.32
In further distinguishing between idealism and dogmatism, Fichte contends that
unlike the latter - which entails materialism, fatalism, and determinism-idealism espouses
an active notion of subjectivity as opposed to something passive. Also, idealism also
stresses the self-sufficiency of the self, from which the objects in space could be derived–
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for Fichte, the I is a pure act (Tathandlung).33 In order not to reduce the I to mere
epiphenomenon, Fichte advocates the elimination of the thing-in-itself.
Although an important doctrine of the Wissenschaftslehre, besides stating that
positing is the “heart” of his system and that it refers to the I’s “self-intuition,” Fichte
does not bother acquainting his readers with the import of this important principle,
forcing his commentators to look to other aspects of his theory for its meaning. It makes
sense, therefore, that there is disagreement among Fichte interpreters about how to
approach this aspect of his view. I am cognizant of the fact that there have been attempts
in the literature to subject this Fichtean doctrine to phenomenological and semantic
interpretations. I will argue, however, that Fichte understands knowledge in terms of an
interaction between the subject and the object.

2.3.1 The I’s Self-Positing Activity
A major characteristic of the Wissenschaftslehre is that the I posits (Setzen) its
existence unconditionally as both the subject and the object of knowledge. This idea is
unique to Fichte’s philosophical position and does not exist anywhere in the critical
theory prior to Fichte,34 and fulfills an important epistemological function in his thought.
The importance of this doctrine in Fichte’s philosophical view is underscored by the fact
although his theory remained a work in progress his commitment to the idea remained
steadfast. Fichte employs this concept in overcoming the dichotomy between the subject
and the object.
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Fichte’s characterization of the I’s self-positing activity is in evidence in his
account of the I’s threefold activity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. However, my
intention here is not to examine his complex account of his three principles of
knowledge. Rather, it is to dwell rather narrowly on the epistemological significance of
positing in his broader intellectual theory, and will approach it from the standpoint of
what I construe to be Fichte’s stated objective as announced in the First Introduction to
The Science of Knowledge, viz.,
the total eradication and complete reversal of current modes of thought on these
topics, so that in all seriousness, and not only in a manner of speaking, the object
shall be posited and determined by the cognitive faculty, and not the cognitive
faculty by the object.35
What Fichte references is the either/or approach that traditional metaphysics adopted in
viewing the relationship between us and the external world, an approach that tended, for
the most part, to make the subject the recipient of data from the object in the quest to
explain our theoretical knowledge of the natural world.
Fichte credits Kant’s categories of the understanding with pointing him toward
the ground of his system.36 Fichte is seemingly disappointed that the categories of the
understanding assumed a different role in Kant’s theory. He criticizes Kant for not
making the categories of the understanding the highest principle of his theory, something
Fichte thinks contributed to Kant’s inability to carry out the “examination of the
possibility of metaphysics, while at the same time laying down the method and the rules
of the same.” For instance, Fichte thinks that Kant does not satisfactorily account for the
process that yields the categories. Nor does he think that Kant satisfactorily explains how
it is that what goes on in consciousness is determined (bestimmt) by the thing.
35
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The Wissenschaftslehre adopts the mind-set that the self is absolute, absolute in
the sense that it operates by its own laws and, therefore, unconditioned by objects in
space. Consequently, the self is able to posit its existence as the subject and the object.
Moreover, Fichte invokes the notion of positing to think of the relation of the subject to
the object both as identical with and opposed to each other-in a draft of a letter to
Reinhold, Fichte states that positing refers to the mind’s self-intuitive character: “The I
has an inner intuition of itself.” Fichte seeks to make practical reason the basis for
theoretical reason by summoning (auffordern) the self to “free action.” In Fichte’s view
then, the self enjoys a unique form of awareness through its self-constitution, that is, the
self enjoys a self-awareness that makes it always present to itself in consciousness. If the
self is always present to itself in consciousness, then such a consciousness has to be
different than the subject’s consciousness of the objective world. LaVopa writes:
To think of self-positing exclusively as an act is to deny that the primordial “I”
exists in itself or for objects in a causal series. The self is unique in that it “comes
to exist for itself” in an act of unconditionally spontaneous self-awareness. In
that sense, the I is self-grounding; there is no kind of “being” prior to the act.
Fichte’s point was not simply that the self is not an object in relation to external
objects. It cannot make itself an object vis-à-vis itself, even when it reflects on
itself. When the “I” thinks about itself, as opposed to thinking about anything
else, it does not create a representation that is in some sense independent of it. Its
self-reflection is its being, since thought and object, agent and product, are one…
and the self has no kind of being apart from the act of self-positing that is selfconsciousness.37
Fichte dismisses the idea that knowledge can be grounded in a world-related awareness
because everything that takes place in the mind can be explained on the basis of the mind
itself.
Fichte’s account of self-positing leads me to three interrelated conclusions. First, I
claim that Fichte employs the notion of positing to develop a first-person epistemology.
37
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What this means is that Fichte draws attention to what it is that we are capable of
knowing as human beings when we claim to have knowledge, and cautions against
holding cognitive claims that depend on the outside world for validation. Farr writes:
Human knowledge must begin and end with self-knowledge. The boundary of
finite human knowledge is the activity of the I. That is the I can have no
knowledge of nature except through its own activity. Hence, the boundaries of
finite human knowledge are indeed subjective as pointed out. However, Kant
never showed how at the base of subjectivity lie two opposing feelings (the
feeling of freedom and the feeling of necessity) whereby subjectivity and
necessity are constituted. It is with this bold discovery that the path toward the
1794–95 Wissenschaftslehre begins.38
In this way, Fichte makes subjectivity and objectivity co-implicatory, that is, he makes
them two sides of the one and same reality, and evaluates their relationship from the point
of view of the subject.39 Like Kant, Fichte believes the cognitive subject can comprehend
only the object it shapes or fashions.
Second, by making the I self-intuit in the grounding of knowledge rather than
being aware of a mind-independent reality, Fichte joins Kant in rejecting a
representationalist solution to the problem of knowledge. Kant initially formulates the
problem of knowledge in representationalist terms but later rejects a representationalist
solution. Fichte asserts:
I call your attention to the fact that this is the very essence of transcendental
philosophy, namely, that it does not engage directly in representing, but rather in
representing the process of representation itself…. Once this philosophical
pathway has been discovered and entered upon , then it becomes clear that it is the
only path which will lead to a well-founded knowledge.40
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This is Fichte’s way of insisting that subjectivity be thought prior to representation, i.e.,
any theory of knowledge worthy of the name must be based on pre representational
consciousness instead of representation. By pre representational consciousness is meant
that representation is explained by a higher, preconscious principle.41
Third and relationally, by rejecting a representationalist solution to the problem of
knowledge, Fichte also rejects a causal theory of knowledge in whatever form, especially
in its Cartesian variation. Farr agrees:
Therefore, the I is not permitted to ascribe causality to anything other than itself.
It is only through the I’s activity that the external world is experienced. In so far
as the I discovers itself to be the ground of all experience, it discovers itself to be
the ground of all laws that govern experience, and also the origin of any
purpose.42
Since reason is continuously present to itself in consciousness, Fichte cannot fathom its
being reduced a variable independent of space, nor does he fathom how it can be made to
conform to the standards set by objective reality. Since positing indicates the self’s
summoning to free action, “the influence of the other is not a causal one, but an influence
compatible with freedom and intelligence, namely, a summons or invitation.”43
Based on Fichte’s rejection of a representationalist solution to the problem of
knowledge, namely, his rejection of the claim that thought can comprehend an
independent reality in its objective existence, Fichte could be reasonably said to argue
that knowledge is mediated rather than immediate.44 A potential problem looms though.
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Does Fichte then fit the narrative of the analytic philosopher who accuses the idealist
philosopher of denying the existence of the objective world?

2.3.2 Fichte’s Philosophical System and the Solipsism Charge
The doctrine of positing is the high point and yet the most controversial of
Fichte’s philosophical position. On the one hand, it makes it possible for Fichte to
develop his monistic philosophical program. On the other hand, it becomes its Achilles’
heel. The claim that idealism denies the existence of objects in space, originally leveled
against Kant by philosophers of analytic persuasion, has been extended to the friends of
the critical system, including Fichte, and continues to resonate even in contemporary
philosophical discussion. In relation to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, the charge that his
view is subjectivist continually recurs. For instance, Pippin accuses Fichte of
overestimating the creative capacities of the human mind, while failing to recognize the
contribution of nature in the explanation of knowledge,45 an accusation that Fichte denies.
Later in his career, as Fichte tries to reformulate his position, he tries to respond
to this charge. For example, in his Wissenschaftslehre: Nova Methodo, Fichte expresses
belief in the reality of the object as a unique entity. He argues:
We will take for granted that one assumes that things exist outside of oneself. In
support of this assumption one appeals to one’s inner state. It is from within
oneself that one obtains this conviction: one is conscious of an internal state from
which one infers the existence of objects outside oneself.46
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Neuhouser rightly comes to the defense of Fichte by advising that Fichte’s
characterization of knowledge as self-knowledge should be understood
epistemologically, and that if this piece of advice is heeded the issue of solipsism that has
continued to haunt Fichte’s position would not arise. He states:
Of course, Fichte’s doctrine of intellectual intuition should not be understood as
attributing to the human intellect the power of creating its objects of knowledge;
what it borrows from this theological conception, rather, is the general notion of a
species of awareness in which the distinction that is normally made between the
intuiter and that which is intuited does not apply, a state of affairs that Fichte
wants to ascribe, in some form, to the subject’s self-positing.47
Neuhouser rejects the notion that Fichte’s cognitive subject creates its objects ex nihilo,
and conjectures that Fichte is not interested in the world of ordinary consciousness.
Rather, according to Neuhouser, Fichte holds that the object of cognition is
transcendentally constituted by the subject, the negation and self-affection of the absolute
ego, the condition of consciousness of freedom.48
Fichte’s strongest defense yet comes from Ameriks. In a manner that consistent
with Wayne Martin, Ameriks claims that Fichte Wissenschaftslehre is foundationalist
rather than subjective. Ameriks argues that although Fichte had “strong metaphysical
concerns,” due to his concern with “freedom and focus on thought and representation
rather than nature as the starting point” of his philosophical investigation, he (Fichte)
considered himself an idealist:
Precisely because he follows in Reinhold’s wake, it can hardly be denied that
Fichte is very concerned with knowledge, especially knowledge in a most
rigorous “scientific” sense, a true Wissenschaftslehre. But it also cannot be
denied that he has a strong metaphysical concerns, and that he repeatedly
characterizes himself as an “idealist” because of his interest in freedom and
focus on thought and representation, rather than nature, as a starting point. All
this is consistent with taking Fichte to have a robust belief in physical reality,
47
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very much as most of us ordinarily think of it, with beings and powers that are
not literally contained in or completely under the control of human or super
human personal agents.49
Ameriks further suggests that Fichte, to the extent that he dismisses the concept of thingsin-themselves in philosophy, is closer to the empiricist philosophers than the rationalists.
However, unlike his empiricist counterparts who focus on sense perception as the source
of knowledge, Ameriks observes, Fichte is concerned, instead, with how we acquire the
realization that there exists an object in space, a determination he thinks Fichte seeks to
make at the moral level.50
Evaluated within the framework of the early Jena project Fichte’s characterization
of the relation of the cognitive subject to its object could be said to be heavily tilted in
favor of the former, which makes the latter’s existence possible, something Ameriks is
willing to concede. However, he suggests that Fichte, and probably Reinhold, were
attracted to Kant’s system because of the promise of freedom it contained. Furthermore,
Ameriks indicates that they would probably have been disappointed by Kant’s inability to
offer a theoretical characterization of freedom. Consequently, according to Ameriks,
Fichte would have been tempted to overcompensate for this perceived Kantian
inadequacy by tending to overstress freedom to the near exclusion of the object.51
Fichte’s preoccupation with freedom, on the one hand, and his perception of
Kant’s failure to provide such an account, on the other, was even more strongly felt in the
immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, an event that challenged the old ways of
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looking at reality. His concern with freedom led him to liken his system to the French
Revolution. He writes:
My system is the first system of freedom. Just as France freed man from external
shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of things in themselves, which
is to say, from the external influences with which all previous systems–
including the Kantian–have more or less fettered man. Indeed the first principle
of my system presents man as an independent being. During the very years when
France was using external force to win its political freedom I was engaged in an
inner struggle with myself and with all deeply rooted prejudices, and this is the
struggle that gave birth to my system. Thus the French nation assisted in the
creation of my system. Indeed, it was while I was writing about the French
Revolution that I was rewarded by the first hints and intimations of this system.52
Incidentally, Fichte was not the only one who saw a connection between his theory and
the French Revolution. His Contribution to the Reflection of Public Opinion Concerning
the French Revolution (Beitragezur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die
Französische Revolution) (1793) earned him the reputation of a Jacobin, a charge
Radrizzani believes remotely contributed to the atheism controversy that led to Fichte’s
dismissal from the University of Jena in 1799.53
By likening his system to the French Revolution, Fichte hints at the fact that the
French Revolution offers new insights into questions of our cognitive relationship with
the world, in the process challenging the hitherto unchallenged notion of normativity.
Specifically, Fichte thought it underscored the freedom of human agency in the
constitution of phenomena, which was previously made the exclusive preserve of the
divine.
Second, for Fichte, the French Revolution provided the blueprint for the liberation
of thought, a paradigm he used to introduce speculative dimension to thought by making
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the self revert to itself for knowledge. Based on his speculative approach to the problem
of knowledge, Fichte dismisses the notion of things-in-themselves as mere inventions
devoid of reality, further insisting that they should be eliminated from philosophical
consideration if thought is to be unburdened and set free.
To state the point differently, by describing his theory as the one of freedom,
Fichte is distancing himself from his predecessors, whom he accuses of destroying the
freedom of the subject by locating activity in the object and passivity in the subject. On
his account, positing constitutes the mind’s original mode of existence, an act that does
exclude, of necessity, the notion of the subject’s independent existence.

Conclusion
This chapter examined Fichte’s original philosophical position with emphasis on
his doctrine of positing. Although seduced by the Copernican turn in philosophy, which
acknowledges the primacy of practical reason in the grounding of knowledge, Fichte is
sympathetic toward Reinhold’s notion of systematicity rather than Kant’s. In his bid to
reconstruct the critical philosophy, Reinhold proposes to deduce philosophy from a selfevident principle from which the remainder of the discussion could be rigorously
deduced. While he endorses the general idea of basing philosophy on a unitary principle,
Fichte takes issue with Reinhold’s candidate, the principle of consciousness, substituting
for it the subjective principle. On the basis of his fundamental principle of philosophy,
Fichte discovers the principle of his epistemology that is able to posit itself as both the
subject and the object of knowledge.
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The role of positing in Fichte’s theory cannot be underestimated and constitutes a
departure from his predecessors, including Kant and Reinhold, whose influence on Fichte
is well known. In particular, Fichte invokes the notion of positing to purge philosophy of
what he terms the mischief of things-in-themselves, thereby making it possible for the
mind to generate its content rather than depend on the data furnished by the objective
world. For Fichte, not only is the object the creation of the subject, any suggestion that
there exists a mind-independent world that could be grasped in its objective existence is
to be rejected, since nothing can be shown to exist beyond experience.

Chapter Three
The Wissenschaftslehre as Circular Epistemology
Introduction
The task of this chapter is to examine the epistemological significance of circular
justification within the context of Fichte’s intellectual theory. Fichte holds circular
demonstration to be an important component of thought and indeed of the entire
philosophical enterprise, so much so that to eliminate the same from philosophical
consideration would amount to, in his view, denying human understanding its requisite
foundation.
Although only a selected aspect of his overall philosophical method, circular
demonstration contributes in no small measure toward the understanding of Fichte’s
philosophical position as well as the subsequent philosophical discussion, especially the
philosophical view of Hegel, which Fichte’s position partially inspires.1 Although Fichte
assigns circular reasoning a prominent epistemological task in his system, it has received
only scant attention in the literature. Several factors may have contributed to what I am
calling this attitude of neglect, including the fact that Fichte himself would have been
more interested in understanding it than with acquainting his reader with the full
epistemological import of the strategy.2
The position defended here is similar to Rockmore’s in several respects. In
particular, I will argue the thesis that when Fichte’s thought is viewed from a certain
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vantage point, it could be justifiably shown that he employs circular justification to
designate philosophy a hypothetical rather than a certain science.3 To state the thesis
differently, I will claim that Fichte appeals to circular proof in order to show that
knowledge claims are valid only within conceptual frameworks in which those claims are
entertained since, in his view, claims to know that extend beyond sense perception cannot
be reasonably defended:
A finite rational being has nothing beyond experience; it is this that comprises the
entire staple of his thought. The philosopher is necessarily in the same position; it
seems, therefore, incomprehensible how he could raise himself above
experience.4
It is the impossibility for the human mind to have a direct and complete grasp of the
external object that Fichte’s circular justification is meant to emphasize. In this way,
Fichte utilizes circularity to make us aware of our limits and finitude as human beings.
To be sure, this approach puts me at odds with other interpreters of Fichte,
especially those who privilege a foundationalist approach to his philosophical view.
Contrary to the antifoundationalist perspective, the foundationalist insight maintains that
although Fichte concedes that human thought is inescapably circular, it does not see
Fichte as indicating, by this manifest admission, that philosophy is incapable of
producing certainty. According to this insight, by virtue of his designating philosophy the
science of science, not only does Fichte believe that philosophy has the responsibility of
demonstrating what it means to know something with certainty, it is actually capable of
producing such certainty. Seen from such angle, the foundationalist interpretation

3

Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), 107.
4
J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, p. 8.

74
contends that it is highly unlikely that Fichte would have reduced philosophy to a
discipline that is capable of yielding only “hypothetical’ knowledge.5
I begin by providing a tentative description of circular argumentation. Since
circularity is the epistemological contrary of linearity, both are explored together. I will
next examine circular justification from the point of view of method in philosophy.
Thereafter, I dwell on the notion of opposition as embedded in Fichte’s three principles
of knowledge to show that Fichte is favorably disposed toward circular epistemology.

3.1 Circular Argumentation: A Tentative Description
A description of circular justification cannot be meaningfully separated from that
of its opposite in the geometrical framework, linearity, since the presence of one implies
the absence of the other. An epistemological demonstration could be said to be circular
“in so far as the truth of the system of philosophy is supposed to be a function of the truth
of its starting point; which, in turn, is supposed to be demonstrated by the very system in
question.”6 Understood as such, circularity could be reasonably opposed to its
epistemological opposite, linearity, the view that a philosophical argument “presupposes
explicit beginning or ending points of a chain or arguments or reflection, points which are
taken as absolute in some sense or another.”7
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Rockmore indicates that linearity and circularity have their origin in geometry but
remarks that they could be used for functions that are otherwise than geometrical, for
example, they could be utilized to justify claims to knowledge. According to Rockmore,
circular and linear demonstrations both have a decent representation in the history of
philosophy that goes back to the pre-Socratics.8 Although both epistemological models
are represented in the Western philosophical tradition, there is good reason to believe that
linearity remains the preferred justification in philosophy and continues to dominate the
intellectual debate even today. For Seigfried, the fact that theories of philosophers such as
Nietzsche, Charles Sanders Pierce, and William James have been unable to completely
escape fundationalist metaphors succinctly demonstrates this fact.9 Part of the appeal of
linear argument may not be unconnected with the fact that it is the intellectual model that
has been passed down in the Western philosophical tradition from generation to
generation over the years. At least since Plato, the philosophical tradition has tended to
construe genuine knowledge as reason’s ability to intuit reality in its objective
existence.10
But our fascination with linear reasoning might be driven by a host of
considerations that are not wholly philosophical. Somehow, we tend to be more favorably
disposed toward systems that make it possible for us to verify that projects embarked
upon are capable of yielding measurable outcomes. Conversely, we tend to view with
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disdain or suspicion any process that is perceived to be inconclusive. With its clearly
identifiable starting and ending points, it is not surprising, therefore, that we find linear
proof more appealing than its circular counterpart that many still associate with vicious
circularity or error in the reasoning process.
Stoehr rightly observes that humans tend, for the most part, to seek closure to
situations, and are disappointed when things remain unresolved, especially when such
lack of closure borders on painful experience. For example, a family whose loved one has
gone missing in combat will achieve closure only when the issue of that loved one’s
status is successfully determined. According to Stoehr, it is the desire for closure in our
lives that that often propels us toward the divine or the absolute.11 Following from this
argument is the inference that we are more likely to be suspicious of a strategy that
appears to be open-ended than the one that facilitates us in the resolution of our issues.
Another reason for our favorable disposition toward linearity may pertain to the
influence of the theologies of the major world religious traditions, for example,
Christianity and Islam. Both Christianity and Islam tend to interpret our presence on earth
in teleological terms, and successfully convinced their adherents it is a worthwhile
venture subordinating the here and now to the yet to come. A variant of this theology
could be found in Augustine who claims that the human person, who is created for
relationships with God, continually yearns for union with the creator: “For you have
made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”12 For the adherents of
these religious traditions, while the here and now may be good, since it is not the ultimate
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it is nothing in comparison to the eternal bliss that is reserved by God for those who
distinguished themselves while on Earth.
For better or for worse, these factors make us seem to privilege linearity over
circularity. Without any shadow of doubt, linearity’s gains constitute circularity’s losses.
For instance, there has been a quick rush to dismiss circular justification as a mere
geometrical pictorial metaphor undeserving of any serious intellectual consideration.
Some people also tend to associate circular reasoning with attempts to escape the
responsibility of having to demonstrate one’s cognitive claims.
Stoehr speaks for me when he argues that circularity definitely has something to
contribute to the epistemological debate and is, therefore, deserving of every serious
attention. Rockmore agrees: “In his claim that theory is necessarily circular and
inevitably circular Fichte rehabilitates a form of argument that had been much neglected
since early Greek thought.”13 By his rehabilitation of circularity, Fichte has shown that,
contrary to popular perception, circular reasoning does not render impossible the search
for reliable knowledge or certainty; instead, it specifies the nature of the certainty or
reliable knowledge philosophy is capable of yielding, namely, that truths are products of
their conceptual frameworks. In my view, if not for anything else, circularity is worth our
consideration for its pedagogical value. What is more, if anything is good in and of itself,
philosophy is that something irrespective of whether or not it yields any concrete
outcome.
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3.2 Circular Justification and the Question of Method in Philosophy
Although only a selected aspect of Fichte’s overall philosophical system, circular
demonstration draws attention to the problem of method in philosophy and, for that
matter, any discipline that is concerned with the problem of knowledge. The question of
method, whose main aim is the acquisition of truth, and the avoidance of error,14 is as old
as philosophy itself and remains a controversial subject. At least since the pre-Socratics,
philosophers have used a wide array of methods in formulating and defending their
philosophical positions. What this implies is that our attempts to understand philosophical
theories are tied to a large extent to the conceptual framework within which the theories
in question were formulated.
If the absence of dissension with respect to what constitutes an acceptable method
of inquiry in any given field is a positive, then it could be stated that some specialties fare
better than others. For example, it could be assumed that mathematics and the sciences
fare better than philosophy in this regard. A typical scientific method utilizes the resource
of experimentation, relying almost exclusively on the testing of hypotheses. Closely
aligned with the scientific approach is the mathematical paradigm, which probes
propositions in order to make determinations about the presence of contradictions or lack
thereof. Moulines cautions, however, that the absence of significant disagreement within
the scientific framework should not be confused with homogeneity. For instance, he
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draws a line of demarcation between Newtonian science and other scientific theories.15
Although science may not be a homogeneous discipline, the scientific community is
united in the belief that knowledge transcends experience. What is more, scientists view
the scientific method as the method par excellence and judge it capable of yielding
objective knowledge, a view that is shared by some philosophical systems, for example,
analytic philosophy. This point of view is articulated by Bertrand Russell, who reportedly
accuses anyone opposed to this point of view of insincerity.16
Moser quite appropriately takes issue with this mind-set, especially that of
Bertrand Russell, for suggesting that anyone who fails to recognize the scientific method
as the method par excellence is “insincere.” Moser maintains that arguments relating to
the dependability of memory or sense perception as a reliable source of knowledge are
merely presumptive and, therefore, inconclusive.17 Moser seems to be rehearsing the
thesis of John Stuart Mills, who reportedly views consensus in any given field as inimical
to progress, rationality, and truth. Mills reminds us that human beings are necessarily
fallible, further maintaining that when it comes to the search for truth, disagreement with
regard to method should be privileged. Implicit in Mills’ argument is the idea that each
approach brings only a perspective to a debate without any one position completely
exhausting the discussion. To the extent that no one view brings any discussion to an end
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by itself, consensus might prevent the discovery of truths embedded in dissenting
positions.18
Kant finds the appropriation of the mathematical method for the resolution of
philosophical problems problematic. In his view, the mathematical paradigm fails as a
philosophical strategy because it cannot, for example, provide “transcendental and
philosophical proofs,” that are crucial for the resolution of the problem of knowledge.19
Kant believes that the resolution of the problem of knowledge rests with his critical
philosophy, whose strategy is the examination of our cognitive faculties in order to
ascertain how much thought can comprehend independently of the mind’s activity.
One important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing conversation is that
there cannot be a sole method of philosophy, even as the aim of every philosophical
system remains the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error. There are as many
philosophical methods as there are philosophical systems. Philosophical strategies, to the
extent that they are based on certain categories or assumptions, remain the sole
prerogative of the philosopher, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to defend the
position that there is only one acceptable way of doing philosophy. The strategy for the
acquisition of truth is varied for philosophy, and what each method does is merely
specify how it arrives at its truth. We will now proceed to look at circular argumentation
in Fichte’s system.
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3.3 The Wissenschaftslehre as Circular Epistemology
The issue of when circular demonstration emerged in Fichte’s philosophical
thought is debatable. For example, Rockmore does not detect any circular reasoning in
Fichte’s view prior to the review of Aenesidemus.20 For his part, Breazeale detects
circular tendencies very early in Fichte’s theory, and asserts that the tendencies in
question are latently evident in his early attempts to formulate his philosophical position,
viz., the second edition of An Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, and the first part of
his Contribution Toward the Correcting of the Public Judgment of the French Revolution
respectively.21 Breazeale further contends that in the wake of Aenesidemus, Fichte
wrestled with the idea of incorporating circular demonstration in his theory, a struggle
that received a major boost from his discussion with Johann Jacob Mnioch between
November 1792 and March 1793. Breazeale’s strategy is to show that circularity has
always been a part and parcel of Fichte’s thought and not something he abruptly turned to
in order to bail out his system when it ran into problems.
While there is consensus in the literature that thought becomes inescapably
circular in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, commentators are disagreed, however, about how
to interpret this aspect of his theory, whether such an interpretation should proceed in
accordance with the letter of his system or whether it should be conducted in a manner
that is consistent with its spirit. I will identify the former approach as the one of the
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foundationalist insight, and the latter as that of the antifoundationalist perspective. I
define foundationalism operationally as “the form of epistemological strategy that intends
to identify secure foundations for knowledge.”22 I will understand antifoundationalism as
“any effort to validate knowledge claims without appealing to an absolute or ultimate
basis known with certainty, whether the latter is held to be unattainable or the model of
knowledge as a unified structure resting on a foundation of certainty is rejected in
principle.”23
In what follows, I will review the debate between these two modes of
interpretation as they relate to circular proof in Fichte. I plan to focus on the robust
discussion on this subject between Tom Rockmore and Alain Perrinjacquet. The debate
between Rockmore and Perrinjacquet, as I understand it, concerns what could be
perceived as a tension in Fichte’s position, namely, his insistence, on the one hand, that
philosophical inquiry should be deduced from a self-evident principle known to be true,
and his submission, on the other hand, that the principle in question cannot be
demonstrated as true.24
Rockmore interprets this as Fichte’s way of conceding that even though
philosophy is genuinely concerned with the search for truth, it is impossible to attain that
truth in practice. In this regard, according to Rockmore, philosophy, on Fichte’s account
becomes a hypothetical science. Perrinjacquet disagrees with Rockmore, and denies any
tension in Fichte’s position on account of the so-called twin problem in his view.
Perrinjaquet argues that Fichte aimed to design a philosophical system whose status was
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comparable to geometry and, therefore, capable of yielding certain truths. Furthermore,
Perrinjacquet maintains, even though Fichte rejects a theoretical ground for philosophy,
he identifies a practical principle that would facilitate philosophy in the acquisition of
truth. Suffice it to say that it is not the scope of this dissertation to engage in an elaborate
reconstruction of the arguments of Rockmore and Perrinjaquet; rather, it is a recap of
their arguments, as I understand them to relate to the present discussion.

3.3.1 Circular Justification in Fichte: Rockmore and Perrinjaquet in Conversation
3.3.1.1 Tom Rockmore
In recent times, Tom Rockmore has been the most vocal advocate of the
antifoundationalist reading of Fichte’s system. His preference for an antifoundationalist
interpretation is informed by several factors. First, he is convinced that Fichte sought to
be true to the spirit of Kant’s view, the thrust of whose argument makes objectivity an
extension of subjectivity. Rockmore thinks that Fichte’s open admission about the
circular nature of human thought, if it is to be consistent with the spirit of Kant’s
transcendental project, cannot ignore the fact that the mind cannot produce certainty, an
idea that was introduced by Kant’s so-called Copernican turn in philosophy.
Second, Rockmore sees a correlation between Fichte’s manifest admission about
the circular nature of the mind and his submission that philosophy arises out of the
problems of life. Rockmore hypothesizes that if the idea of an initial ground of system is
to be taken seriously, that is, if theory is to be derived from practice, then we are left with
the option that only practice can deal with the problems of life, a domain that has proven
incapable of yielding certainty.
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Rockmore’s third reason for what he calls the failure of foundationalism as a
philosophical strategy. For Rockmore, foundationalism in any form is “closely related to
a traditional, normative view of knowledge as a permanent, ahistorical framework or
matrix of reality, the way things are, the nature of the world.”25 Since foundationalism
fails, according to Rockmore, we are better off turning to circularity. One thing
Rockmore thinks is well known is the fact that circularity cannot provide certainty.26 On
the whole, in relation to foundationalist and antifoundationalist perspectives, Rockmore
advocates the abandoning of the former while advocating patronage of the latter since, in
his view, the former has become antiquated.
Rockmore argues that viewed broadly from the point of view of the reconstruction
of the critical philosophy, Fichte could be shown to espouse an antifoundationalist notion
of system, that is, a foundationless system of philosophy. In Rockmore’s view, this has to
be the case, since he does not see any way around what he considers the inherent
contradiction in Fichte’s view, namely, his insistence, on the one hand, that philosophy
should be anchored on a self evident principle, and his claim, on the other, that the
principle in question cannot be demonstrated to be true.27 By this forthright admission,
maintains Rockmore, Fichte indicates that, “philosophy consists in the search for a first
and absolute principle of human knowledge. According to Fichte, such a principle is
unlimited and indemonstrable when it is a question of a true first principle.”28
To some extent, Rockmore thinks that Fichte makes circularity correlative with a
foundationless system. Rockmore elicits a distinction between a founded system, which

25

Rockmore,”Antifoundationalism, Circularity and the Spirit of Fichte,” 100.
Ibid., 110.
27
Ibid., 81.
28
Rockmore, Before and After Hegel, 36.
26

85
he equates with the Cartesian Archimedean ground and a foundationless system, which
he associates with Fichte’s view, and cautions against the tendency to reduce one to the
other. To the extent that there is justification for a system, Rockmore argues that such a
system has a ground. While Fichte has offered to erect his system on a self-evident
ground, Rockmore does not think that Fichte considers this ground final in the Cartesian
Archimedean sense. One may wish to recall that Descartes invented the modern concept
of mind by deducing the concept of external space from the indubitability of his mind.
Thus, in Rockmore’s view, Fichte has proven that it is possible to demonstrate our
cognitive claims without a Cartesian ground.29
Rockmore conjectures that Fichte’s commitment to an unfounded system of
knowledge is attested to by Fichte’s designation of philosophy as a hypothetical science,
that is, that philosophy can never go from likelihood to certainty. Also, he perceives
Fichte’s process of arriving at knowledge to be circular, a circularity that is inescapable.
Based on these considerations, Rockmore concludes:
Both the hypothetical character and the circular nature of philosophy point to the
same conclusion: philosophy cannot yield certainty, although knowledge requires
it. In other words, what we can know is that the search for knowledge is an
endless task because the theoretical requirement of a foundation, in other words
noncircular form of reasoning cannot be met in practice.30
While philosophy yearns for certainty, Rockmore does not think that it can be achieved
epistemologically.
By Fichte’s constructing an unfounded system of knowledge, Rockmore suggests
that Fichte manifestly concedes the impossibility of eliminating circular argumentation
from philosophical consideration. He argues:
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Fichte perceives a circular relation between the first principle and the theory that
follows from it. For the first principle underlies the latter, and the latter returns,
so to speak, to the former. The result is a circle, if Fichte is to be believed, the
unsurpassable circle of the human mind: either knowledge constitutes itself within
the framework of this necessary circularity, or knowledge is not possible.31
In this way, according to Rockmore, Fichte makes knowledge self-grounding.
For Rockmore, Fichte’s espousal of circular justification is indicative of his
departure from Descartes as well as Reinhold, who seeks to make Kant fit a Cartesian
model of mind. Fichte rehabilitates a strategy that was previously associated with failed
attempts at justification. Rockmore asserts:
Fichte certainly shares Reinhold’s acceptance of the basic rationalist’s model of
system in terms of an initial principle. But in consequence of his rejection of the
view that this first principle can be established as correct, Fichte makes the very
circularity, which Reinhold sought to avoid as a mistake in reasoning constitutive
of knowledge. It follows that circularity cannot be avoided but rather must be
acknowledged.32
Second, it means that, according to Rockmore, by casting circular demonstration in new
light, Fichte is abandoning a quasi-linear approach to knowledge that has tended to
dominate the Western philosophical tradition since Aristotle for a circular one.

3.3.1.2 Alain Perrinjacquet
Alain Perrinjaquet objects to Rockmore’s antifoundationalist reading of Fichte,
claiming that it distorts Fichte’s philosophical position. Like his other counterparts
bringing a foundationalist perspective to Fichte, such as Daniel Breazeale and Wayne
Martin, Perrinjaquet argues that Fichte is developing a foundationalist theory of
knowledge in the quest for certainty. He takes seriously the Reinholdian influence on
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Fichte that went a long way in shaping Fichte’s views, something Perrinjacquet is
surprised that Rockmore’s account fails to acknowledge.
Exploiting the Reinholdian/Fichtean connection, Martin maintains that early in his
career, Fichte considered himself Reinhold’s disciple, and that not only did he succeed
Reinhold as the chairman of the philosophy department at the University of Jena, he also
continued with the the exposition of the critical philosophy in its Reinholdian
presentation. In Martin’s view, Fichte inherited Reinhold’s audience that was already
acquainted with Reinhold’s presentation of the critical philosophy, including its
foundationalism, and that it would have been a serious mistake on Fichte’s part to
substitute for Reinhold’s method something completely new. According to Martin, in
order not to alienate his audience at Jena, Fichte would have elected to maintain
Reinhold’s formulation of the critical system, including its foundationalism.33
Unlike Rockmore, Perrinjacquet does not perceive any contradiction between
Fichte’s proposal to deduce philosophical inquiry from a self-evident principle known to
be true, on the one hand, and the concession that the principle in question cannot be
demonstrated to be true. He notes:

Although Fichte rejects the idea of a theoretical ground of philosophy, as
Rockmore maintains, he provides a practical foundation for this science.
Philosophy acquires in that case a quite different status than that of a merely
hypothetical form of knowledge.34
Perrinjacquet understands Fichte to be arguing that the resolution of the problem of
knowledge should take place at the level of practical rather than theoretical philosophy.
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Hence, argues Perrinjaquet, Fichte’s rejection of theoretical reason as the fundamental
ground of philosophy concerns an initial type of ground and should not be construed as
his opposition to the idea of ground in general.35
Like Rockmore, Perrinjaquet is willing to concede that Fichte grants that there is
more than one approach to philosophy. However, he maintains that Fichte also concedes
that what makes it possible for the philosopher to justify his cognitive claims in his
system is the philosopher’s conviction. According to Perrinjacquet, Fichte believes that,
unlike his predecessors, including Kant, who lacked conviction about their philosophical
systems, he is fully convinced about the certainty of the initial ground of his
Wissenschaftslehre: “His description of his conviction concerning the truth of this
principle allows no room for the sort of probabilism that would be implied by a merely
circular foundation.”36
Breazeale concurs:
The misconception that Fichte believed the certainty of the first principle of the
Wissenschaftslehre could or ought to be somehow “proven” must be firmly
rejected. On the contrary, he insisted that the first principle of a systematic
philosophy must be “purely and simply certain” and explicitly added that such a
proposition “cannot derive its certainty from its connection with other
propositions.” When Fichte concedes that ‘every proof presupposes something
that is simply indemonstrable’ he is manifestly not suggesting that the first
principle from which we proceed in philosophy cannot be known to be true;
instead, he is insisting that the first principle must be self-evident.37
Since Fichte believed that philosophy, as the science of science, has the onus of
establishing what “certainty means and what it means to know something with certainty,”
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Breazeale argues, he could not have conceived philosophy as a “hypothetical form of
knowledge.”38
Breazeale attributes an antifoundatioanlist reading of Fichte to the failure to
distinguish between extra systematic and intra systematic strands of circular
demonstration in Fichte’s position. Breazeale designates extra-systematic circularity
Fichte’s forthright admission of the circularity of reason, whereas by intra-systematic
circularity he means Fichte’s allusion to the latent instances of the circularity that
characterizes the relationships shared by the various propositions within his system.
While Fichte may have considered the former type of circularity unavoidable, he would
have been open to the idea that the latter type could, under certain circumstances be
waived. More specifically, Breazeale understands by extra systematic circularity, the
presuppositions that philosophy must entertain, including its fundamental ground and
laws regulating its operations, and therefore, according to Breazeale, “the condition for
the possibility of inquiry–including inquiry into the possibility of consciousness itself.39
Perrinjacquet acknowledges that Fichte assigns a demonstrative function to
circular reasoning in Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, but insists that
the function in question is aimed at showing the discovery of the principle rather than
establishing the first principle of the Wissenschafslehre. In his view, Fichte utilizes
circular proof to establish three things. The first circular function of thought, according to
Perrinjacquet, concerns the completeness of his philosophical system. Perrinjacquet
appropriately reports that Fichte makes the first principle of his system the highest
principle of philosophy and that as such, the starting principle of his theory furnishes the
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certainty of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as the certainty of subsequent propositions in
his theory. To underscore the completeness of his position, argues Perrinjacquet, Fichte
turns to circular proof to show that the outcome of his philosophical inquiry is also its
starting principle.40
The second function, according to Perrinjacquet, pertains to the uniqueness of his
philosophical theory. While Fichte insists that the initial ground of his theory is the
highest principle of philosophy, he is willing to grant that one could possibly detect other
instances of knowledge that may not be deduced on the basis of the first principle of the
Wissenschaftslehre. These instances of knowledge may be true, even though they may
possibly stand in opposition to the initial ground of the science of knowledge.
Perrinjaquet indicates that Fichte admits, by this concession, that there could be more
than one principle of philosophy and, by implication, more than one possible system of
knowledge. But since the first principle of the Wissenschaftslehre is the highest
philosophical principle, the system it grounds is unique even if contradicted by systems
derived on the strength of other principles.41
The third function Fichte assigns circularity, according to Perrinjacquet, relates to
the laws of thought philosophy employs for its deduction. By this, claims Perrinjaquet,
Fichte’s philosophical view presupposes the laws which regulate or govern the operations
of the mind, and that these laws are contained within the Wissenschaftslehre itself.42
The foundationalist perspective seemingly concedes that there is textual evidence
to support the position that Fichte makes philosophy self-grounding, in terms of deducing
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possible experience from the initial ground of his system. Breazeale claims, however, that
this does not tell the whole story. He argues that Fichte judges the first principle of his
system capable of yielding only inner truth. But since he thought a philosophical system
ought to possess inner and outer truth, maintains Breazeale, Fichte believed that the outer
truth of his system could be provided by the actual construction of a system of
philosophy:
What is hypothetical is not the certainty or inner truth of this principle; instead,
the philosopher’s “hypothesis” is simply that this immediately certain and selfevident proposition is in addition capable of serving as the first principle of a
transcendental deduction of experience. It is this hypothesis that must
subsequently be confirmed by actually constructing a system on the basis of this
Grundsatz.43
Breazeale maintains that, considered by itself, Fichte’s principle of the
Wissenschaftslehre, which is the I, to be completely certain.
Perrinjacquet further views Fichte’s nondemonstrability of the fundamental
ground of the Wissenschaftslehre argument from the point of view of the disagreement
between idealism and dogmatism concerning the starting point of philosophy, especially
in light of Fichte’s insight that neither system can refute the other on its own terms. He
states:
Fichte grants that he cannot demonstrate to the dogmatists themselves that their
starting point is wrong. The reason for this inability is that transcendental
philosophy and dogmatic realism share no common principle, and someone can
prove something to someone else only if they grant at least one common
principle. Moreover the dogmatist cannot be possibly constrained to adopt the
starting point of the transcendental idealist. This starting point cannot be
externally enforced, since it is the consciousness of freedom.44
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Although the idealist is not able to convince the dogmatic philosopher about the starting
principle of his system, it is emphatically not the case, according to Perrinjacquet, that the
starting principles of the two systems are both self-evident. Rather it is the case that the
starting principle of idealism, to the extent that it founds the system of freedom, cannot
be enforced from outside.
Suffice it to make one quick comment. Since the present disagreement between
Rockmore and Perrinjaquet borders on whether an analysis of Fichte’s circular proof
should be conducted in accordance with the letter or the spirit of his theory, it may be
worthwhile heeding Breazeale’s caution against the tendency to overstretch the
letter/spirit distinction. Breazeale quite correctly notes that a satisfactory characterization
of Fichte’s philosophical view requires both approaches, maintaining that looking at a
philosophical theory strictly from the angle of its letter may render the position
in question dull. Similarly, he fears that an analysis of a position strictly in terms of its
spirit to the exclusion of its letter may encourage the attribution of views to an author that
are not his own. Breeazeale rightly notes that both approaches are required if justice is to
be done to Fichte’s philosophical theory.45
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, my sympathies lie with the
antifoundationalist perspective in the present debate. If there is more than one way of
interpreting a philosophical theory, as is emphatically the case, there is definitely more
than one way of looking at Fichte’s philosophical system, including an
antifoundationalist reading, since no single insight completely exhausts his view.
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Furthermore, given the complex nature of Fichte’s thought, excluding other
interpretations may not be the right way to proceed.
Second, although Fichte advocates the grounding of philosophy on a self-evident
principle of philosophy, which opens his system to a foundationalist interpretation, both
participants in the current conversation agree that Fichte’s notion of foundationalism is
not traditional in terms of the search for an Archimedean ground. I find Baur’s comments
in this regard very insightful. Baur notes:
On the one hand, Fichte’s thought seems to be a form of foundationalism: after
all, Fichte is seeking to give an account of the ground of all possible experience.
On the other hand, Fichte’s project seems to be antifoundationalist: traditional
foundationalism entails the search for some kind of foundationalism that is other
than the doubting self and to which the doubting self may appeal in order to put
an end to its doubt. By contrast, the first principle or “foundation” of Fichte’s
philosophy is nothing other than the questioning, doubting self-consciously
fallible self that knows that no given content can be necessarily determinative
for it.46
Baur makes the important point that while Fichte’s theory may be foundationalist, it is
not foundationalism in the traditional sense since it depends on nothing “other than the
doubting self” for the establishing of its claims to know.

3.3.2 Fichte, Systematicity, and Circular Justification in Philosophy
Fichte’s open admission that human thought is inescapably circular occurs in the
review of Aenesidemus. In the work in question, he writes:
The faculty of representation exists for the faculty of representation and through
the faculty of representation: this is the circle within which every finite
understanding, that is, every understanding we can conceive, is necessarily
confined. Anyone who wants to escape from this circle does not know himself
and does not know what he wants.47
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Fichte later restates this claim in Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, his
attempt to present his thought as a coherent system, advising the adherents of the critical
system not to be “embarrassed” by the fact that human reason is circular:
No one has cause to be embarrassed by the existence of this circle. To desire the
abolition of this circle is to desire that human knowledge be totally without any
foundation. It is the desire that nothing should be absolutely certain and that all
human knowledge should instead be only conditional, that no proposition
should be valid in itself, but rather that every proposition should be so only on
the condition that the proposition from which it follows is valid. In a word, it is
to claim that there is no immediate truth at all, but only mediated truth – but
without anything to mediate it. Whoever so wishes can always ask himself what
he would know if his I were not an I, that is, if he did not exist, and if he could
not distinguish something not-I from his I.48
Fichte maintains that his manifest admission about the circular nature of thought
constitutes one of the major differences between the Wissenschaftslehre and other
philosophical systems, for although, according to Fichte, other systems of philosophy are
fully aware that reason is necessarily circular, only his Wissenschaftslehre is willing to
concede it. It may be recalled that Fichte conceived his circular strategy during the
review of Aenesidemus. As acknowledged by Fichte, Aenesidemus conferred the painful
realization that neither Kant nor Reinhold had resolved the problem of philosophy, that
is, neither had established philosophy as a systematic science.
Ameriks notes that the concern with systematicity was not unique to the critical
philosophy or German idealism, as previous intellectual traditions, including rationalism
and empiricism, all wrestled with this problem. The belief has been widespread in
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philosophy that the ability to refute skepticism of any kind is contingent upon the ability
to show that philosophy is a scientific discipline.49 This belief, according to Ameriks, was
inspired by the successes of the new sciences, in particular the scientific revolution
initiated by Galileo, Newton, and Descartes–the new sciences were perceived as
providing a blueprint for achieving systematicity in any given field. Ameriks maintains:
The strong systematicity of their works was a striking feature from the start; the
general laws that they contained, and the way they were combined to explain
many very different kinds of phenomena were critical to their initial formulations
in the precise mathematical “system” of the world.50
Although Kant’s position was inspired, among others, by Descartes, who is credited with
the creation of a new physics and a new ground whose epistemological characteristics
seemed to belong to the realm of ordinary science or common knowledge, he flatly
rejected the utilization of the mathematical strategy for philosophical inquiry. For Kant,
his critical theory was synonymous with systematic science.
Rescher intimates that two notions of system tended to dominate the systematicity
debate at the time of Kant. The first notion of system, which predominated the scientific
discussion, was in evidence in “Euclid’s systematization of geometry,” “Archimedes”
systematization of statistics,” and Newton’s systematization of celestial mechanics.” The
second understanding of system, according to Rescher, was prevalent within the
rationalist system of philosophy and characteristic of the theories of Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz.51 Kant understood system in terms of the “unity of manifold modes of
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knowledge under one idea,” and whose realization was made possible by the art of
system creation, architectonic.52
Rescher argues that Kant’s idea of knowledge as the interrelating of facts makes
him more sympathetic to the rationalist philosophers than the scientists, especially
Christian Wolff who “stressed the deductive interaction of the individual propositions.”53
Kant’s identification with the rationalist philosophers was borne out of the quest to
construct a priori system of possible experience, as well as his desire to demonstrate that
experience rightfully belongs in the domain of possible experience. And that as such,
Kant thought he was better served if he engaged concepts as they emerged rather than
proceed from clearly defined concepts like mathematics.54
Kant’s understanding of system, construed to be normative by both critics and
followers, was rejected. In particular, his contemporaries feared that he failed in his
project of the unification of thought he claimed to have accomplished. If the refutation of
skepticism was based on the ability to establish philosophy as a science, then Kant’s
peers were concerned that his failure to achieve one, namely, his failure to bring
systematicity to philosophy, translated into an inability to refute skepticism. For the postKantian German idealists, the way to make Kant realize his objective rested with the
provision of a new foundation for his theory, i.e., deduce philosophy from a unitary
ground known to be true.
The idea of system that calls for the standing of philosophy on a unitary principle
acknowledged to be true was the brainchild of Reinhold, who pioneered the
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reconstruction of the critical system. Reinhold’s principle of consciousness, his highest
principle of philosophy, related the representation to the subject and the object and
distinguished it from both. While he supported the general idea of basing philosophy on a
self-evident principle, Fichte queried Reinhold’s principle of consciousness, claiming that
it failed as the highest ground of philosophy. What this suggests is that despite Fichte’s
insistence that his position is an extension of Kant’s, his understanding of system, in
terms of the ground of philosophy, is consistent with Reinhold’s system rather than
Kant’s. In the wake of Aenesidemus, Fichte parted ways with Reinhold by adding a
circular dimension to thought.
With respect to circularity, Fichte was anticipated by Vico, who had previously
held a circular view of history. Giambattista Vico (1688–1744) started out as a pupil of
radical Cartesianism before abandoning it for a circular view of human history. Taking as
his premise the principle that the truth is made, Vico rejected the idea of eternal truths,
especially as proposed and defended within Cartesianism, a view that was heavily
influenced by his studies in literature, history, law and Greek societies. Berlin argues:
Vico became convinced that the notion of timeless truths, perfect and incorrigible
clothed in universally intelligible symbols which anyone, at any time, in any
circumstances, might be fortunate enough to perceive in an instantaneous flash of
illumination was a chimera.55
Contra Descartes, who made the ego discovered by the cogito the most secure ground of
knowledge, Vico makes the true correlative with the made. Vico holds truth to be the
creation of humans, further arguing that mathematical truths, thought to be pure by
Cartesianism, were our inventions after all. And to the extent that they are our own
creation, mathematical truths are valid, Vico maintains, “only about concepts not the
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objective world.” For Vico, the a priori deductive method is not applicable outside the
framework of mathematics and the natural sciences.56
The difference between Fichte and Vico, however, is that, unlike the former,
Vico does not attach any epistemological significance to his cyclical view of history.
While Fichte himself may not have engaged in a systematic construction of a circular
epistemological theory, there is textual support that the method is in evidence in his
philosophical position. For example, circular proof could be found in Fichte’s
characterization of the relation of the ideal and the real, the I to the Not-I, the subject to
the object, etc. What I intend to do in the next section is to appeal to Fichte’s dialectical
reasoning, as embedded in his three principles of knowledge, in an attempt to show that
his view is circular.

3.4 Fichte’s Three Principles of Knowledge and Circular Demonstration
Fichte’s three principles of knowledge are intended to highlight the opposition or
contradiction that characterizes the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity,
form and content, the ideal and the real, practical and theoretical reason. Prima facie, the
idea of contradiction appears incompatible with Fichte’s overall philosophical project of
ridding philosophy of its dualistic tendencies, which he claims rendered Kant’s position
unsatisfactory. However, Breazeale calls attention to an inherent dualism in Fichte’s view
that is often overlooked. He writes:
Despite influential claims to the contrary, Fichte remained throughout his Jena
period a dualist of a sort, a thinker for whom difference remains fundamental and
philosophically irreducible and for whom pure can never be more than, on the one
hand, a philosophical hypothesis or fiction, produced by reflective abstraction for
the purposes of a mere “thought-experiment,” or, on the other hand, a necessary
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goal or practical demand, posited–but never achieved–by the finite “I,” which
finds itself compelled by the very structure of selfhood to maintain that it ought to
be what it never is: namely, infinite in its freedom and unified in its nature.57
Fichte formulates the problem of knowledge in terms of the subject’s interaction with the
object. For example, Wood indicates that the fundamental ground of Fichte’s position
already presupposes a subject/object relation: “The I, therefore, seems to contain in itself
the ground of every relation of a subject to an object, and thereby also the form of every
possible subject-object relation, hence the sole sufficient condition for the possibility of
all cognition.”58
In Breazeale’s view, Fichte understands the freedom/necessity relationship to be
necessarily unstable, unstable in the sense that it illustrates the “ongoing temporal process
through which the original contradiction between the I’s freedom and its original
limitation is transformed into an endless struggle to subordinate the latter to the former:
to transform every ought into an is.”59 Rockmore corroborates Breazeale’s claim by
arguing that viewed from a foundationalist perspective, the three principles of knowledge
mirror Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception that grounds Kant’s system.60
Although Breazeale identifies dualistic tendencies in Fichte’s philosophical
system, he aptly distinguishes Fichte’s brand of dualism from other forms of dualism,
including the Kantian, insisting that the Fichtean dualism is neither metaphysical nor
psychological, rather it is transcendental. He writes:
Like Fichte’s “idealism,” his “dualism” is neither metaphysical nor psychological
in character, nor is it a dualism of reality and appearance. It does not postulate the
57

Breazeale, “The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre,” 189.
Allen Wood, “The I as Principle of Practical Philosophy,” in The Reception of Kant’s Critical
Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 95.
59
Breazeale, “The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre,” 191.
60
Rockmore, “Antifoundationalism, Circularity and the Spirit of Fichte,” 101.
58

100
interaction of two sorts of substance, nor is it a description of how an independent
reality appears to a finite consciousness. Nor does the Wissenschaftslehre pretend
to recount the acts and passive states of some special sort of “mental objects.” The
dualism of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre is strictly transcendental and is implicit in
the structure of consciousness itself, at least as that is characterized within this
system. It is a dualism of infinity and finitude, of self-positing and feeling, of
freedom and facticity, or, to employ the technical technology of the Foundation
of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, or Tathandlung (Act) and Anstoss (check)–
neither of which can be ultimately reduced to nor derived from the other and both
of which are necessary for the possibility of ordinary consciousness and selfconsciousness. 61
Fichte does not think that the reality of freedom can be derived from that of limitation or
vice versa. But he thinks that, transcendentally, one could be presupposed as a necessary
condition for the possibility of the other. Although Fichte’s dualism is transcendental, due
to the fact that the three principles of knowledge refer to the opposition between
subjectivity and objectivity, form and content, ideal and real, etc., analyzed from an
antifoundationalist standpoint, Fichte’s three principles could be utilized to support a
circular reading of his theory.
Fichte’s first principle of knowledge states: “That whose being or essence consists
simply in the fact that it posits itself as something existing, is the self as absolute
object.”62 His second principle of knowledge stipulates: “So surely is a not-self
absolutely opposed to the self.”63 The third principle of knowledge claims: “Both self and
not-self are posited as divisible.”64 To be sure, this constitutes a major shift in Fichte’s
position. On the one hand, he postulates a fundamental ground for his system. On the
other hand, the actual delivery of his system leaves him with a trio. Remarkably, Fichte
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does not see this as constituting a problem to his system since, in his view, the second
and the third principles derive their certainty from the certainty of the first.
Let us look at the three principles more closely. The first principle posits the
absolute existence of the self, something that reveals the most primordial act of the mind,
i.e., reason’s awareness of its free activity. The I is able to posit itself unconditionally
because it operates by its own laws and, hence, cannot be conditioned by the outside
world. But Fichte perceives a problem here. Although reason, in its most primordial
mode, is able to generate its content, namely, affirm its existence unconditionally, Fichte
fears that the I’s affirmation of its existence alone does not constitute knowledge or
consciousness because consciousness is necessarily consciousness of an object.65 Due to
the fact that Fichte considers knowledge to be both active and passive, the absolute act of
consciousness, the self’s self-positing activity, which is infinite and unbounded, has to be
negated by another absolute act of consciousness.
The second principle, that of the I’s counterpositing by the not-I, which is
conditioned relative to content, offers the opposition that is required to keep the I in
check (Anstoss). Interestingly, the act of counterpositing, another absolute act of
consciousness, is performed by the I itself. Copleston indicates that the conterpositing act
of the not-I is also absolute because the counter positing object is not your typical object
but transcendental, meaning that Fichte entertains a generic concept of objectivity,
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objectivity counterposited within subjectivity.66 But since both the positing subject and
the counterposited object are absolute, Fichte is concerned that the I and the not-I run the
risk of annulling each other. Fichte is afraid that this threatens the sustenance of
consciousness, something that should not be allowed to happen. So Fichte has to find a
way of preventing the I from cancelling the not-I and vice versa. And the solution is the
third principle.
The I’s absolute affirmation and the not-I’s absolute opposition, conditioned
relative to form, prompt an act of synthesis, an act that momentarily unifies the subject
and the object by allowing the I and the not-I, through the process of reciprocal
determination to confront and limit each other.67 The synthetic principle which represents
the resolution of the thesis/antithesis disagreement may turn out to be unsatisfactory or
one-sided and trigger another opposition, reducing synthesis to a thesis for the process to
start all over again. LaVopa summarizes the process this way:
In the larger structure of the argument, theoretical knowledge turns out to harbor a
fundamental contradiction, one that can be resolved only by demonstrating that
the possibility of theoretical reason is contingent on its subordination to the
moral knowledge that Kant called “practical” reasoning. In the transition from the
theoretical to the practical, the deduction reverses direction; a dialectical spiral
out from the first principle becomes a plunge back into it. Having extended the
text as its point of departure, the self-positing “I” becomes its point of
culmination.68

Thus, Fichte demonstrates the relationship of the I to the not-I by showing that they could
be split into further parts.69
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If Rockmore is right, Fichte utilizes the concept of opposition or contradiction to
explain consciousness from the point of view of both idealism and realism. Hence,
according to Rockmore, he conceives the self as activity, i.e., the self as simultaneously
subject and object. From the point of view of idealism, Fichte entertains the notion of a
free autonomous subjectivity that is unconstrained by its environment, a characterization
of the self that Fichte realizes to be inadequate, since it fails to offer any account of how
it is that the I is constituted or affected by nature.70 The realization that an account of the
self from the perspective of idealism alone is inadequate leads Fichte, according to
Rockmore, to provide another from the standpoint of realism. It is by considering the self
also from the point of view of realism that will result in a comprehensive account of the
self.
Looking at the self from the angle of realism, Rockmore maintains, Fichte
acknowledges the contribution of the objects in space in the constitution of knowledge.
That is, Fichte hopes to escape the solipsism charge by identifying something the self can
reference in the justification of its cognitive claims. While Rockmore understands Fichte
to be open to the idea that objects in space contribute to the grounding of knowledge, he
explains that reality, in Fichte’s view, is reality for us rather than something that is
externally imposed on the self. Rockmore thinks that, like Kant, Fichte accepts that both
idealism and realism are necessary for a satisfactory theory of knowledge, while
maintaining that the resolution of the problem of knowledge is possible at the practical
rather than the theoretical level.
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Following from this, it could be concluded that Fichte holds a dual view of
subjectivity; from the point of view of realism, Rockmore sees Fichte as embracing the
notion of a finite subject; while from the perspective of idealism, Rockmore thinks that
Fichte adopts a theoretical view of an infinite subject and, hence, allows both notions of
subjectivity to furnish our understanding of self-consciousness.
In Fichte’s view, then, consciousness presupposes both freedom and limitation, as
the former is necessary for the possibility of the latter and vice versa. But unlike the the
Kantian things-in-themselves, the check involved in this relationship is not external but
internal to consciousness. The influence of the other is not causal but an influence that is
compatible with “freedom and intelligence, a summons or invitation.”71

Conclusion
This chapter investigates the import of circular strategy within the framework of
Fichte’s overall philosophical position. Its argues that appraised from the standpoint of its
spirit rather than its letter, Fichte’s philosophical system could be shown to be developing
a circular epistemology, understood as a theory of knowledge that does not postulate
clearly identifiable starting and ending points for philosophical inquiry. Broadly
understood, it is the desire to unify practical and theoretical reason that leads Fichte to
embrace a circular theory of knowledge.
By the same token, it could also be shown that despite his attempts to overcome
the dualism by adopting a monistic approach to the problem of knowledge, Fichte, in
certain readings, still formulates the problem of knowledge in terms of an interaction
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between the subject and the object, ideal and real, form and content. However, unlike his
predecessors, including Kant, who construed circular justification in terms of a vicious
circularity, in the process presenting it as something to be avoided, Fichte rehabilitates
the strategy forcing us to see it in new light. I conclude by arguing that Fichte’s circular
proof calls attention to the fact that claims to know cannot be validated independently of
the finite human being who is interested in the question of knowledge. More importantly,
Fichte’s circular demonstration invites us to acknowledge our fallibility as human beings.

Chapter Four
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre: A Critique
Introduction
In the Second Introduction to The Science of Knowledge, Fichte posits: “I have
long asserted, and repeat once more, that my system is nothing other than the Kantian;
this means it contains the same view of things, but is in method quite independent of the
Kantian presentation.”1 Although this claim was quite appropriately rejected by Kant, it
was well received by the young Schelling and Hegel, who believed at first that Fichte’s
philosophical position was an advance on Kant’s. For instance, in a draft of a letter to
Hegel, Schelling writes:
Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are
still missing. And who can understand results without premises? Perhaps a Kant,
but what is the great crowd to make of it? Fichte, the last time he was here, said
that one must have the genius of a Socrates to fathom Kant. I find this truer
everyday. We must continue still further with philosophy. Kant has swept
everything away, but how is the crowd to notice? One must smash it to pieces
before their very eyes, so they grasp it in their hands. The great Kantians now
everywhere to be seen have got stuck on the letter, and bless themselves on seeing
still so much before them. I am definitely convinced that the old superstition of
so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion has in the minds of most
already once more being combined with the Kantian letter. It is fun to see how
quickly they can get to the moral proof. Before you turn around the Deus ex
machina springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in heaven above!
Fichte will raise philosophy to a height at which even most of the hitherto
Kantians will become giddy. I am now receiving the beginning of the detailed
exposition from Fichte himself, the Foundation of the Entire Science of
Knowledge.2
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In the above correspondence, Schelling alludes to what is widely believed to constitute
the liability of Kant’s philosophical position, namely, the noumena/phenomena split,
while expressing confidence in Fichte’s ability to correct the problem in question.
The issue of Fichte’s Kantianism is a controversial one and continues to generate
intense debate in contemporary philosophical discussion. Karl Ameriks finds the
argument that Fichte’s view is a variant of Kant’s, or for that matter that Fichte’s
philosophical theory surpasses that of Kant, a laughable proposition. He thinks it
ridiculous that shortly after Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy was widely held as a
major breakthrough in philosophy, attempts were made to subordinate it to the theories of
his followers, including that of Fichte.3 Ameriks is disappointed that these claims were
made while Kant was still around. Ameriks insists that a distinction should be drawn
between the philosophical positions of Kant and Fichte since, in his view, the latter read
the former through Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy that sought to return Kant to
Cartesian ideals.
Other commentators, for instance, Zöller, perceive a certain degree of correlation
between the systems of Kant and Fichte. While they agree that certain aspects of Fichte’s
theory are consistent with the spirit of Kant’s transcendental project, they also observe
that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is an original philosophical position in its own right.
These commentators insist that Fichte should have moderated his claims with respect to
his Kantianism or at least qualify it. To the best of their knowledge, Fichte’s
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relation to Kant is “a curious mixture of unconditional allegiance and metacritical
distancing.”4
I argue, with Rockmore, that “although deeply influenced by the critical
philosophy, Fichte’s position, which is never a restatement of Kant’s, is always very
much his own.”5 I will utilize a historical approach to argue that, on the one hand,
Fichte’s theory is true to the spirit of Kant’s Copernican turn. On the other hand,
however, his Wissenschaftslehre is a philosophical system in its own right. Fichte’s
philosophical system marks a significant departure from the systems of his predecessors,
including Kant and Reinhold. Although Fichte himself was cognizant of the fact that his
views were influenced by Kant and Reinhold, he was equally convinced that his science
of knowledge was a philosophical project of its own.

4.1 Fichte’s Relationship to Kant
Nevertheless, Fichte consistently maintains that his philosophical theory is
Kantianism properly understood. This makes it incumbent on the person interested in
understanding the relationship in question to take seriously this Fichtean claim, especially
his understanding of how his relationship to his master was instrumental to the evolution
of his original philosophical theory. This approach would help us to appreciate why
Fichte espoused the views that he did. It would also assist us with the understanding of
the issues his system was meant to address.
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Fichte’s relationship to Kant is a reflection of Kant’s relationship to post-Kantian
German idealism, which could aptly be described as ambivalent, perhaps complex. In the
immediate aftermath of Kant’s Copernican turn, the post-Kantian German idealists
considered themselves Kantians, identifying with the principles of his critical system.
Their Kantianism was challenged almost immediately. Although attracted by the
critical philosophy, the post-Kantian German idealists expressed reservations about the
delivery of Kant’s philosophical theory. They were concerned that Kant failed to
accomplish the task he had set for himself. In particular, they took issue with Kant’s
retention of a limited notion of ideality, claiming that it diminished the efficacy of his
Copernican revolution in philosophy. In their view, the systematicity Kant promised was
nowhere present in what he presented to the public. Thus, by their criticism of Kant, the
post-Kantian German idealists transformed themselves into the critics of Kant’s critical
method.
Despite their reservations about the presentation of Kant’s system, the idealists
were resolved that Kant’s position should be reconstructed, not abandoned as advocated
by his early critics, especially Hermann, Herder, and Jacobi.6 It should be indicated that
while the motivating circumstances for their attraction to the critical method is the same
for the idealists, it is inaccurate to characterize post-Kantian German idealism as a
homogeneous movement, as each idealist “pursued a very individual project that was
guided by the very assumptions concerning what philosophy is all about.” For Fichte, it
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meant substituting Kant’s modest account of knowledge for a radical one.7
Fichte’s initial relationship to Kant could be traced to 1791 when the latter hosted
him in Königsberg, a relationship that became warmer after the publication of An
Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation. Fichte’s early attempts to introduce himself to
the sage of Königsberg, failed leaving him disappointed. It took the appearance of the
Versuch in order for him to win the notice of Kant, who arranged for their second
meeting, which was beneficial to Fichte in several ways. For example, Kant was
instrumental to the publication of the Versuch. Also, based on Kant’s recommendation he
got a teaching position in Danzig. Very significantly, Kant’s perceived endorsement
removed whatever doubts Fichte may have had about his ability to do philosophy, which
also went a long way to transform a hitherto unknown private tutor into a philosopher of
consequence in eighteenth-century Germany.
In relation to the reconstruction of the critical system, a task that Fichte’s
Wissenschaftslehre partially represents, Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie plays a pivotal
role. Although not a well known philosophical figure, Reinhold is important in postKantian German idealism tradition for a variety of reasons. First, he pioneered the
revision of the critical system, in the process setting the agenda that went a long way to
influence the philosophical thoughts of other post-Kantian German idealists.
Second, even though his concept of system differs in many respects from Kant’s,
it was Reinhold, not Fichte, the self-proclaimed legitimate successor to Kant, that Kant
endorsed as possessing the correct view of his system.
Third, it was Reinhold’s reformulation of the critical system that prompted the
skeptical attack on the transcendental system. We recall that in his quest to recast the
7
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critical theory, Reinhold offered to secure philosophy on the principle of consciousness.
By this proposal, Reinhold wanted to show that consciousness was grounded in selfconsciousness. He also sought to show that both practical and theoretical reason were
grounded in the faculty of representation. Aenesidemus challenged Reinhold to
demonstrate how every activity of the mind could be reduced to representation. Implicit
in this is that despite Fichte’s claim that his philosophical position was a direct
consequence of Kant’s transcendental system, I hold that it was Reinhold’s Elementary
Philosophy that served as the trigger event for the conception of his original
philosophical view, that is, Kant’s views as received and interpreted by Reinhold.
So far, I have detected two influences that shaped Fichte’s philosophical view,
influences he himself quite appropriately acknowledges, as can be evidenced from the
Preface to the First Edition of Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre. In the
passage in question, Fichte writes:
I leave to future ages the task of fathoming the genius of this man who, often as if
inspired on high, drove philosophical judgment so decisively from the standpoint
at which he found it toward its final goal. I am just as sincerely convinced that
nothing, following Kant’s spirit of genius, could contribute more to philosophy
than Reinhold’s systematic spirit, and I believe that I recognize the honorable
place which Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy will always be accorded, despite
the further progress which philosophy must necessarily make under the guidance
of whomever it may be. I have no malicious wish to undervalue or depreciate any
service at all. I realize that every step which science has ever attained had first to
be climbed before a higher one could be reached, and I take no personal credit for
the fortunate accident of that I am called to work after excellent workmen have
gone before me.8
Fichte is making two seemingly contradictory claims. On the one hand, he acknowledges
the monumental contributions of Kant to the history of Western philosophy. On the other
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hand, he claims that both Kant and Reinhold have failed in their effort to resolve the
problem of knowledge, and further insinuates that his theory surpasses theirs.
Without question, there are striking similarities between the views of Kant and
Fichte. However, I dare to say that Fichte’s theory, to the extent that it aims to overcome
the shortcomings of Kant’s position, is his own and, therefore, “not on all counts a direct
critical response to Kant.” As indicated earlier, not only is his theory his own, it
represents a major departure from the positions of his predecessors, including Kant’s and
Reinhold’s. Amazingly, Fichte continued to insist that his view was Kantian although he
was fully cognizant that his philosophical system was unique. Fichte seems to be
rehearsing a familiar theme: like the rest of the post-Kantian German idealists, Fichte
came to understand that his path to philosophical greatness went by way of Kant,
something he took full advantage of and continued to emphasize even when he went his
separate way.
It is common knowledge that Kant’s followers and critics alike took issue with the
dualistic tendencies that inhered in his position. Although Kant’s Copernican turn in
philosophy synthesizes thought and experience, it elicits a distinction between objects as
they are in themselves and objects as they appear to us. Kant rightly restricts knowledge
to objects that are given in experience, while claiming ignorance about objects as they are
in themselves. Understandably, Kant wants to be able to explain experience by
postulating something that causes it. This move was objected to by his critics on the
grounds that it constituted a violation of the underlying principle of the critical method,
namely, the application of the categories of the understanding to objects that are not
given in sensation.
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In the wake of Aenesidemus, Fichte came to the painful conclusion that despite
Kant’s claim to have resolved the problem of philosophy once and for all and, further,
despite Reinhold’s reconstruction of the critical system, which Fichte momentarily
believed had purged philosophy of the “mischief” of things-in-themselves, the scandal
confronting philosophy persisted. In the review of Aenesidemus, Fichte notes:
Thus, here at the foundation of this new skepticism, we clearly and distinctly have
that old mischief which, until Kant, was perpetrated with the thing in itself. It
seems to the reviewer anyway that neither Kant nor Reinhold has by any means
declared himself loudly and strongly enough against this mischief, which has been
the common sense of all objections–skeptical as well as dogmatic–which have
been raised against the critical philosophy.9
Evidently, Fichte is concerned about what has become the lingering problem of the thingin-itself, which he maintains constitutes the greatest undoing of Kant’s critical enterprise,
and which he claims further convinces him that an account of the transition from inner to
outer space that does not extend reason beyond sensation is needed if philosophy is to
become truly scientific:
Kant demonstrates that the causal principle is applicable merely to appearances,
and nevertheless he assumes that there is substrate underlying all appearances –
an assumption undoubtedly based on the law of causality (at least this is the way
Kant’s followers argue). Whoever shows us how Kant arrived at this substrate
without extending the causal law beyond its limits will have understood Kant.10
Fichte believes that Kant has to be saved from himself and, accordingly, appropriates the
latter’s concept of transcendental unity of apperception to provide an account of selfconsciousness as self-positing.
Fichte shares Kant’s concern that philosophy stands in need of a fundamental
grounding. However, they disagree about how exactly this ground is to be constituted.
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Fichte’s science of knowledge insists that philosophy must be based on a unitary
principle that is known to be certain and from which the philosophical discussion can be
derived. In the wake of the skeptical attack on the critical project, Fichte also came to the
conclusion that Reinhold’s principle (Grundsatz) was inadequate as the highest principle
of philosophy. Fichte thought that the entire critical method had to be rethought, hence
the formulation of his original philosophical theory.
On the basis of his discovery of an initial ground of philosophy, Fichte identifies a
fundamental ground of his theory of knowledge, or the self, that he claims posits its
existence simultaneously as the subject and the object of cognition. In this way, Fichte
dissolves the tension between subjectivity and objectivity and renders them one and the
same. For example, he uses the concept of the self-positing activity of the self to ground
the transition from inner to outer space on the ideality of the self. In other words, even the
account of opposition that Fichte tries to provide is made possible by the unity of
consciousness:
Since the question arises from a reversion into oneself, from observing that the
immediate object of consciousness is in fact only consciousness itself, it can refer
to no other existence than an existence for us; and it would be absurd to
assimilate it to the question as an existence unrelated to consciousness. Yet it is
the greatest absurdities that seem most commonly put forth by the philosophers
of our day.11
Fichte is opposed to any concept of objectivity that does not, at the same time, include the
idea of subjectivity, since the object is the subject’s object. For Fichte, the opposition of
the subject to the object is a function of thought, and further notes that it is the nature of
the human mind to posit itself and thereafter proceed to posit something in opposition to
itself when, in reality, the counterposited object is the positing subject.
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Although Fichte insists that his theory is Kantianism properly stated, he employs
the technical term positing to radicalize thought in a way that Kant merely imagined.
Höffe explains:
In a radicalization of critique so as to question even the most basic assumptions
and in the attempt to explain the connection of the theoretical and practical
knowledge from one common principle, Fichte seeks the supreme principle of
unity for knowledge in general.12
In Höffe’s view, Fichte sets out to provide an account of knowledge in general, a
consideration that partially accounts for the naming of his philosophical system the
Wissenschaftslehre, or the doctrine of scientific knowledge.

4.2 The Reception of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre
I plan to tentatively examine the reception of Fichte’s original philosophical
insight as a way of getting to Kant’s rebuttal of it. Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy
generated a wide array of reaction, ranging from acceptance to rejection. To
his critics, the critical method was a failed project and should, therefore, be abandoned.
To his followers or defenders, however, it was the only method with the potential of
resolving the problem of philosophy. Amidst all this, Kant himself was confident about
his project, claiming to have resolved the problem of philosophy once and for all, and
warning that any attempt to alter anything about his system would create problems for
human thought.
Apparently, as we shall see shortly, the young Schelling and Hegel, who were
initially supportive of Fichte’s philosophical project, saw things differently and turned
against it. This means, unlike Kant, Fichte never really had defenders. To be sure, he was
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disappointed by the reception accorded his philosophical theory, sometimes tending to
lose control of himself. His original philosophical insight drew criticisms from friends
and critics alike. Some criticisms were general in scope, while others were directed at
specific aspects of his system. For example, his childhood friend Weisshuhn expressed
frustration over his inability to understand Fichte’s characterization of positing, claiming
that his “eyes” were shown something they could not comprehend.13
Remarkably, the strongest objections yet against Fichte’s system were raised by
his fellow post-Kantian German idealists, who had earlier viewed him as providing the
critical system with foundations that Kant merely assumed. Let us take a quick look at
Schelling. Schelling espoused the critical method following his reading of The Critique
of Pure Reason. Like Hölderlin and Hegel, he was a member of a group of Swabian
students that turned to Kant in order to shake off the orthodox influences of the theology
faculty at the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Tubingen. Convinced that Kant provided
the rational foundation for religion, this group sought to follow up on the discussion
initiated by Kant, as well as seek to provide his system with new foundations.14
Though he started out as expounder of Fichte’s system, Schelling later abandoned
Fichte’s position for his own original philosophical program. Breazeale maintains that
Schelling’s first two publications, On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy (1794)
and On the I as the Principle of Philosophy (1795) were devoted, in a qualified sense, to
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the defense of the Wissenschaftslehre. But in addition, Schelling reportedly had his
reservations about Fichte’s view, reservations that were inspired by Spinoza.15
Schelling joined issues with Fichte, in the aftermath of Schelling’s reading of
Spinoza, accusing Fichte of failing to provide an account of nature. It may be recalled
that in the name of making the critical method truly critical, Fichte collapsed the
subjectivity/objectivity dichotomy, and made the two coimplicatory by having the self
posit itself as both the subject and object of knowledge. Schelling argues that Fichte’s
theory fails and ends up as subjective idealism, since it fails to offer an account of nature.
Fichte suspected certain disagreements between his theory and the position of
Schelling. But when those disagreements became the topic of a publication by Hegel, it
became clear to Fichte that Schelling had emerged as an original thinker in his own right.
Aside from the criticism that the Wissenschaftslehre is subjective idealism, Schelling
accuses Fichte of entertaining a narrow concept of intellectual intuition. Unlike Fichte,
who makes intellectual intuition the sole preserve of the subject, Schelling makes
subjectivity and objectivity equal partners in providing the ground of knowledge. Thus
Schelling makes positing a feature of both subjectivity and objectivity. While Fichte
derives the object from the activity of the I, for his part Schelling derives consciousness
from the I and the not-I, thereby making both the subject and the object active.16
Implicit in Schelling’s making of the subject and the object active is his rejection
of the proposal to secure philosophy on a supreme universal principle known to be true,
as proposed by Reinhold and ratified by Fichte. According to Schelling, knowledge could
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be raised to the status of an absolute principle only if it is established as science,
something that is not achievable with Fichte’s view.
Hegel follows closely the example of Schelling in rejecting Fichte’s philosophical
theory. Hegel basically restates the concerns of Schelling. However, he is more effective
in undermining Fichte’s philosophical position. He unfairly but effectively portrays
Fichte’s theory as a failure, further contending that the Wissenschaftslehre anticipates his
(Hegel’s) theory, which he claims constitutes the watershed of the critical project. I will
next look at Kant’s reaction to Fichte’s theory.

4.3 Kant’s Rebuttal of Fichte
Kant took exception to Fichte’s philosophical theory, especially his claim that it
had transformed Kant’s project of the transcendental analysis of reason into the science
of knowledge. Accordingly, he issued a disclaimer. On August 7, 1799, Kant wrote an
“Open Letter on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre.” In the letter in question, Kant protests that
not only is Fichte’s system untenable, as formulated, but that it bears no resemblances to
his (Kant) philosophical project. He declared:
I hereby declare that I regard Fichte’s Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre) as
a totally indefensible system. For the Pure theory of science is nothing more or
less than mere logic, and the principles of logic cannot lead to any material
knowledge. Since logic, that is to say, pure logic, abstracts from the content of
knowledge, the attempt to cull a real object out of logic is a vain effort and
therefore a thing no one has ever done. If the transcendental philosophy is correct,
such a task would involve metaphysics rather than logic. But I am so opposed to
metaphysics, as defined according to Fichtean principles, that I have advised him,
in a letter, to turn his fine literary gifts to the problem of applying the Critique of
Pure Reason rather than squander them in cultivating fruitless sophistries. He,
however, has replied politely by explaining that “he would not make light of
scholasticism after all.” Thus the question whether I take the Fichtean philosophy
to be a genuinely critical philosophy is already answered by Fichte himself, and
it is unnecessary for me to express my opinion of its value or lack of value. For
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the issue here does not concern an object that is being appraised but concerns
rather the appraiser or subject, and so it is enough that I renounce any connection
with that philosophy.
I must remark here that the assumption that I have intended to publish
only a propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy and not the actual system of
philosophy is incomprehensible to me. Such an intention could never have
occurred to me, since I took the completeness of pure philosophy within the
Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of the truth of my work.
Since some reviewers maintain that the Critique is not to be taken literally
in what it says about sensibility and that anyone who wants to understand the
Critique must first master the requisite “standpoint” (of Beck or of Fichte),
because Kant’s precise words, like Aristotle’s, will kill the mind, I therefore
declare again that the Critique is to be understood by considering exactly what
It says and that it requires only the common standpoint that any cultivated mind
will bring to such abstract investigations.17
Among other things, Kant quite appropriately rejected Fichte’s assertion that his position
was merely a propaedeutic and not a complete system. Fichte seems to have forgotten
that Kant’s claim to a successful resolution of the problem of knowledge was ridiculed by
his critics. He also criticizes Fichte for arriving at a concept of a finite human being from
logic alone.
Apparently, Kant seems to have taken the matter personally, and tended to have
pretty strong words for Fichte, as could be seen from the following:
There is an Italian proverb: May God protect us from our friends, and we shall
watch out for our enemies for ourselves. There are friends who mean well by us
but who are doltish in choosing the means for promoting our ends. But there are
treacherous friends, deceitful, bent on our destruction while speaking the
language of good will, and one cannot be too cautious about such men and the
snares they have set. Nevertheless the critical philosophy must remain confident
of its irresistible propensity to satisfy the theoretical as well as the moral, practical
purposes of reason, confident that no change of opinions, no touching up or
reconstruction into some other form, is in store for it; the system of the Critique
rests on a fully secured foundation, established for ever; it will be indispensable
too for the noblest ends of mankind in all future ages.18
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Kant’s disclaimer looks harsh if viewed from the standpoint of someone who had earlier
made similar claims with respect to another person’s theory. Kant had previously claimed
to have understood Plato better than Plato understood himself.19 The difference here is
that Kant had the luxury of making his comments while Plato was long gone. With these
claims and counterclaims, what is the status of Fichte’s theory in relation to Kant’s?
In the course of this dissertation, I have tried to portray the Kant/Fichte
relationship as ambivalent. As Fichte himself has done on several occasions, I have tried
to compare and to contrast the two philosophical systems, highlighting their differences
as well as their similarities. One concrete example may suffice. In chapter 2 I argued that
Fichte rejects a representationalist solution to the issue of knowledge. I also indicated that
this, in my view, was consistent with the spirit of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophy.
Both Kant and Fichte deny the subject a comprehensive grasp of its object in its objective
existence. And if both reject a representationalist solution to the question of knowledge,
then, both could be said to favor the idea that knowledge is mediated rather than
immediate.
What I want to do at this juncture is to dwell on Fichte’s proposal to stand
philosophy on a self-evident ground, the principle of subjectivity, to show that his theory
is both consistent with and opposed to Kant’s. That is, I will argue that, on the one hand,
the basing of philosophical inquiry on a fundamental ground is a residue of Kantianism
preserved through Reinhold. On the other hand, I will contend that Fichte uses the
principle of subjectivity as the starting point of his monistic theory of knowledge, thereby
distancing himself from the master. The position defended here is that while both Kant
and Fichte are concerned about making philosophy scientific, not only is their
19
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understanding of system different, they further disagree about their method of achieving
it.
Reminiscent of Kant’s system, Fichte thinks that subjectivity is prior to
representation. Critical to the projects of Kant and Fichte is the idea that philosophy
should be grounded on the principle of subjectivity, which they invoke in standing
metaphysics on its head in terms of making the cognitive subject active vis-à-vis its
object. But it should be pointed out that the strategy of securing philosophy on the
subjective principle transcends Kant and represents a widespread approach in the
Western philosophical tradition. Seen in that light, Kant and Fichte merely appropriate an
old philosophical strategy.
In order to ensure that philosophy produced a priori knowledge, philosophical
systems earlier than Fichte’s adopted the subject as the starting point of their
investigation. In the modern philosophical period, the method was pushed to prominence
by Descartes and reached its watershed in Fichte. Based on the certainty of his
consciousness, Descartes drew conclusions with implications for the existence of the
objective world. For instance, in the Second Cartesian Meditations, Descartes states:
But I have persuaded myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world: no sky,
no earth, no minds, no bodies. Is it then the case that I too do not exist? But
doubtless I did exist, if I persuaded myself of something. But there is some
deceiver or other who is supremely powerful and supremely sly who is always
deliberately deceiving me. And let him do his best at deception, he will never
bring it about that I am nothing as long as I shall think that I am something. Thus,
after everything has been most carefully weighed, it must finally be established
that this pronouncement “I am, I exist” is necessarily true every time I utter it or
conceive it in my mind.20
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Descartes, who sought to refute skepticism in all forms, thinks that in order to
successfully do this he has to show that our knowledge claims are premised on a secure
principle. Descartes’ discovery of the modern concept of inner space inspired the views
of Leibniz, Locke, and Kant, and the subsequent efforts aimed at attaining certainty in the
field.
Although like Descartes Fichte seeks a first principle for philosophy, one should
resist the temptation to reduce his position to a variant of Cartesianism; his system is not
a search for an Archimedean ground. Seidel agrees:
The difference between the Descartes of the Meditations on the First Philosophy
and the Fichte of the Wissenschaftslehre is the difference between one who
simply accepts the certainty of mathematics but must find “something” (cogito)
that is existent, as well as certain (Descartes), and one who merely starts with
A=A in order to discover that the “synthetic” truth of A=A is really analytic, or
better axiomatic, and depends entirely upon the activity of the synthesizing self
(Fichte). ...Another difference is that Descartes’ “Ego sum, ego existo” is already
too “substantial” for Fichte. Fichte’s “I” or self is essentially activity. And
freedom is hardly a substance in the Cartesian sense.21
While Descartes moves from the indubitability of the ego to prove the existence of
external objects, Fichte moves from the certainty of the self to demonstrate the activity
(Tätigkeit) of the self. Fichte’s search for a ground of system is, according to Seidel,
tantamount to a search for a “ground of explanation” (Erklärungsgrund), the condition
for the possibility of knowledge of an object in general.22
But it is at this point that Fichte turns his back on Kant. Unlike Kant, who opts for
synthesis in his account of knowledge, Fichte radicalizes Kant’s modest system with his
monistic approach, making the subject and nature two sides of one and the same reality.
Ameriks describes Kant’s project this way:
21
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Kant’s philosophy is unique in focusing on a level “in between” the domains of
ordinary empirical judgment and theoretical science. While it accepts both
domains as legitimate, it takes neither as absolutely by itself but rather aims to
articulate the philosophical principles they need to share in order to be jointly
understandable and acceptable.23
It may be worthwhile reminding the reader that although Kant understands the relations
between subjectivity and objectivity in complementary rather than conflictual ways, he
does not view the the relationship in terms of the relationship of matter to form.
Fichte overcomes the self/not-self split, claiming that it is something artificial,
existing only at the level of consciousness, not in fact. Since consciousness fails as a
unifying principle, Fichte thinks we should begin our investigation with selfconsciousness; consciousness must be mediated by self-consciousness:
That the activity of the self and the not-self are one and the same means that the
self can only not posit something in itself by positing it in the not-self…. Passivity
of the self, and of the not-self are also one and the same…. Activity and passivity
of the self are one and the same…. Activity of the not-self are one and the same.24
That the self is able to act this way, according to Fichte, is because it is absolute, absolute
in the sense that it operates by its own laws that are part of its existence and, hence,
unconditioned by its environment.
Another difference between Kant and Fichte pertains to Fichte’s transformation of
Kant’s abstract subject into a finite subject. Since the Kantian subject is an abstract
epistemological principle, he investigates what it means for a rational being to have
knowledge irrespective of time and place. Fichte, on the other hand, examines what it
means for a finite human being to actually have knowledge. Thus, Fichte transforms
Kant’s transcendental idealism, the condition of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever,
into the condition of the possibility of knowledge for finite human beings. I tend to agree
23
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with Radrizzani that although Fichte set out to formulate a philosophical theory, he also
sought to understand the cultural and political events of his day as well as shape their
reception, the French Revolution, for example.25 Rockmore cautions, however, that while
it is not possible to divorce philosophical theories from their milieus, they cannot, by the
same token, be reduced to their historical or cultural environment either.26
This puts me on the wrong side of Copleston, who flatly rejects any attempt to
bring a historical perspective to Fichte’s philosophical position. He claims that Fichte had
previously dissociated his theory, especially his subjective principle, from a finite subject
in the winter of 1810–1. He argues that Fichte is interested in the concept of subjectivity
that has the connotation of “immediate spiritual life” and, therefore, a metaphysical
“subject.” For him, the Fichtean absolute subject is a reference to “infinite activity” and
not an “individual self.”27 He concedes, though, that the metaphysical elements in
Fichte’s position are not altogether self-evident.
Although Copleston is not convinced that Fichte transforms Kant’s conceptual
subject into a finite one, I think it is indeed the case. Copleston seems to downgrade the
impact of the French Revolution on Fichte’s thought, an influence that Fichte himself
acknowledges. For Fichte, the gunshots that reverberated across Jena were fired by a real
human being, Napoleon.
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Conclusion
As noted earlier, like his philosophical theory, which was a theory in progress,
and which underwent fundamental changes during the course of his professional career,
Fichte’s understanding of his relationship to Kant too continued to fluctuate depending on
where he was in his career or what he accomplished at a particular time. To be sure, it
was Kant’s approach to issues of the relation of freedom to necessity that attracted him to
philosophy. However, while certain aspects of his philosophical position look obviously
Kantian, it is equally true that Fichte’s original philosophical position is his own,
something that is well known, including Fichte himself. However, it feels as if, like his
post-Kantian idealism colleagues, Fichte uses Kant to bolster his original philosophical
view before finally stepping out of his shadow. But, owing to the benefits that are derived
from his perceived association with Kant, Fichte is apt to flash his Kantian credentials.
Fichte should not lose sight of the fact that it was his association with Kant that won him
the immediate recognition as a philosopher. It was the same association that also exposed
him, for the first time, to a wide range of employment opportunities.

General Conclusion
This dissertation examined Fichte’s original philosophical position, the
Wissenschaftslehre, against the Kantian background. It investigated the extent to which
Kant’s theory is consistent with Kant’s philosophical view and the extent to which it is
not. The analysis revealed a few things. First, the dissertation gained the insight that on
certain readings, in particular if seen from the angle of its spirit, Fichte’s theory is
consistent with Kant’s so-called Copernican turn in philosophy. The major thrust of
Kant’s intellectual revolution makes the subject active vis-à-vis the object of knowledge.
This constitutes a major break from the previous intellectual paradigms that made reason
the recipient of data from the external object that affects our faculties in our quest for
knowledge. Fichte follows Kant’s example by postulating a supreme universal principle
of knowledge that posits itself simultaneously as the subject and object of cognition.
Thus, like Kant, Fichte locates activity in the cognitive subject rather than the object.
The second insight that was gained concerns the difference between Kant and
Fichte with regard to the presentation of their theories. To be sure, Kant’s Copernican
revolution constitutes a monumental contribution to philosophy. But Kant also retains
some limited notion of the causality that he criticizes. Kant splits the world into the
domains of appearance and things-in-themselves. He restricts knowledge to the sphere of
the former while holding the realm of the latter to be the one of the unknown. For his part
Fichte favors a monistic strategy and makes the subject and the object two sides of one
and the same reality. By his monistic approach to philosophy, Fichte does not only reject
Kant’s dualistic approach to philosophy, he substitutes a monistic one for it. Thus on this
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count, that is, the issue of presentation, Fichte’s system differs from Kant’s. To the extent
that Fichte’s method of unifying practical and theoretical reason differs from Kant’s, his
theory is not the same as Kant’s. Rather, Fichte establishes himself as a philosopher in his
own right. Correspondingly, his system constitutes an original contribution to the
philosophical enterprise.
The third insight relates to the relationship between Fichte and Reinhold, in terms
of the extent to which Fichte’s views were influenced by Reinhold. Admittedly, Fichte
initially bought into Reinhold’s idea of basing philosophical investigation on a selfevident principle known to be true. However, Fichte rejected Reinhold’s designee, the
principle of consciousness, which Reinhold believed reduced every activity of the mind
to representation. Instead, Fichte offered to deduce philosophical inquiry from a higher
principle he thought was better suited to founding philosophy, the principle of the self.
Evidence exists to support the assertion that Fichte later separated himself from
Reinhold, especially at the time of the evolution of his original philosophical insight. In a
fragment of a letter to Reinhold, Fichte writes:
I myself, however, am a declared opponent of your system. But why can one not
be an opponent of your system and at the same time be your personal friend? I
believe that I have justified my opinion of Aenesidemus. From my review of it,
it should at least be clear to you that I have acted in good faith. It is now true that
I now think much less highly of the literary merits of Aenesidemus than I did
even then; yet it does seem to me that it has refuted your Elementary Philosophy.1

Fichte is concerned that Reinhold took the refutation of his (Reinhold’s) system
personally. It will be recalled that Reinhold later abandoned his own original position and
became a student of Fichte, whose theory he partially influenced.
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Fourth, in my opinion Fichte seems to confuse his theory with Kant’s, as is
evidenced by the fact that his claim with respect to Kant’s position continues to fluctuate
depending on the occasion. Sometimes he claims that his view is identical with Kant’s.
On other occasions, he claims his theory surpasses that of Kant. And still on other
occasions, he claims that Kant’s position was developed on account of Fichte’s
principles. One thing that is emphatically clear is that Fichte’s position does not surpass
that of Kant–at least he fails to make that argument. I think Fichte seems oblivious to the
fact that Kant is an important figure in the Western philosophical tradition and that his
theory represents a major paradigm shift in philosophy that, in my view, carries Fichte in
its wings, even as Fichte’s theory remains his own.
Finally, Fichte establishes post-Kantian German idealism as we know it, and
serves as a link between Kant and the subsequent philosophical discussion. Fichte
deserves credit for calling attention to an idea that has gone a long way to influence later
and subsequent philosophical systems, especially the philosophical position of Hegel, the
neo-Hegelians, and Marx. In particular, he deserves credit for transforming Kant’s
abstract notion of subjectivity into a finite one. In the wake of Fichte’s
Wissenschaftslehre, the concept of finite subjectivity has been propelled to prominence in
the philosophical discussion, and rightly so. That the philosopher has nothing beyond
experience as Fichte rightly points out is evidenced by the fact that our humanity is the
only thing that remains the same while our concept of normativity continues to fluctuate.
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